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The Pinkerton Doctrine and Murder 
MATTHEW A. PAULEY, J.D., PH.D.*  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that A hires B to rob a bank in Massachusetts and A then 
hires C to rob a bank in Rhode Island.  B and C have not met face to face, 
but each knows he is part of a conspiracy to rob banks in more than one 
state.  All agree that no one will be killed in the robberies.  A then procures 
D to get a car for use in the robberies.  B uses D’s car to rob his bank.  
During the robbery of C’s bank, C pulls out a gun and shoots and kills the 
bank guard.1 
Clearly, A, B, C, and D are all guilty of conspiracy to rob banks, the 
act to which they agreed.  Clearly too, A, B, C, and D are not guilty of con-
spiracy to murder, because they never agreed to kill anyone.2  C, however, 
is guilty of murder, since he intentionally killed the bank guard without 
justification or excuse. 3  But can A, B, and D also be charged with this 
murder? 
  
 * Matthew A. Pauley, B.A. Williams College, J.D. Harvard Law School, Ph.D. Harvard, is Asso-
ciate Professor of Political Science and Legal Studies and Director of Legal Studies at Manhattanville 
College in Purchase, New York.  He is the author of two books, The President’s Constitutional Oath 
(University Press of America, 1999) and Criminal Law:  Its Nature and Sources (Griffon House, 1999), 
as well as several articles on criminal law, constitutional law, and political thought.  He wishes to thank 
Lois Kane and Frances Rudko for their assistance in the preparation of this article. 
 1. See Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 996-97 (1959) 
(discussing a similar, though significantly different hypothetical). 
 2. See generally Karen Anderson & Megan Bertran, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 33 Am. Crim. 
L. Rev. 729 (1996) (subsequent issues of this journal provide further reviews of the law of conspiracy); 
Theodore W. Cousens, Agreement As An Element of Conspiracy, 23 Va. L. Rev. 898 (1937); Kenneth 
A. David, The Movement Toward Statute-Based Conspiracy Law in the United Kingdom and the 
United States, 25 Vand. J. Transnatl. L. 951 (1993); George Fletcher, Is Conspiracy Unique to the 
Common Law?, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 171 (1995); Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Con-
spiracy, 61 Cal. L. Rev. 1137 (1973); Neal Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 Yale L.J. 1307 (2003); 
Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back From an Ever Expanding, Ever More 
Troubling Area, 1 Wm. & Mary Bill Rights J. 1 (1992).  For a more recent discussion of conspiracy 
law, consult Ira Robbins, Guilty Without Charge: Assessing the Due Process Rights of Unindicted Co-
Conspirators, 2004 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 1 (2004); Nicholas Schuler, Jr., The Lone Conspirator: Criminal 
Law’s Oxymoron: In Defense of the Rule of Consistency in Federal Conspiracy Cases, 2004 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 755 (2004); Jesse Winegrad, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 611 (2004).  
 3. The literature on intentional murder is, of course, too voluminous to cite here.  See generally 
Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Criminal Law 612 (2d ed., West 1986) [hereinafter LaFave & 
Scott 1986]; Wayne LaFave, Criminal Law (4th ed., West 2003) [hereinafter LaFave 2003] (supporting 
the proposition that an intentional killing is always murder if committed without complete or partial 
justification, extenuation, or excuse). 
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There are, of course, several ways in which one person may be guilty 
of a murder committed by another person.  One is by the felony-murder 
rule, which historically has meant that one is guilty of murder if, in the 
course of committing a felony, one causes the death of another person.  In 
this example, if the felony-murder rule applies, A, B, and D could be guilty 
of felony murder of the bank guard – a murder committed by their co-
felon, C. 4  But if the felony-murder rule is not applicable, either because 
the state has rejected the rule, as most commentators have long been urging 
states to do,5 or because the state legislature has defined felony murder as 
second degree murder and the prosecution wants to convict A, B, and D, as 
well as C of first degree murder of the guard, is there another basis for 
finding A, B, and D guilty? 
The doctrine of complicity, also known as aiding and abetting, is, of 
course, another way to make a person guilty of a murder committed by 
someone else.  But would A, B, and D be guilty of murder of the bank 
guard on an aiding and abetting theory in this instance?  On mens rea 
grounds, A, B, and D intended at most to encourage a robbery by C.  In 
Model Penal Code terms, that was their purpose or “conscious objective.”  
But their purpose was not to encourage C to kill anyone.  They had ex-
pressly agreed that no one would be killed.  They did not know that C 
would kill during the robbery.  If aiding and abetting requires a purpose to 
facilitate the particular crime at issue, A, B, and D would not be guilty of 
murder of the bank guard by aiding and abetting. 
On actus reus grounds, there also would be a problem with complicity.  
A did hire C to rob the bank.  He did actively set in motion the crime 
which resulted in the killing of the guard.  But what did B and D really do 
to assist or encourage the robbery by C, much less C’s murder of the 
guard?  All they did was to agree to be part of a larger conspiracy to rob 
banks.  One could argue that they never facilitated C’s specific robbery, 
and that they did nothing to facilitate his killing of the guard.  
There is, however, an alternative way in which A, B, and D can be 
convicted of C’s murder of the guard.  If the court finds that A, B, C, and 
  
 4. The great majority of American jurisdictions adopt the agency theory of felony murder, under 
which a person is only guilty of felony murder if the murder was “by his own hand or by someone 
acting in concert with him or in furtherance of a common object or purpose.” Commonwealth v. Camp-
bell, 89 Mass. 541, 544 (1863).  See e.g. Steven A. Drizin & Allison McGowen Keegan, The Aftermath 
of the Lionel Tate Case: Abolishing the Use of the Felony Murder Rule When the Defendant is a Teen-
ager, 28 Nova L. Rev. 507 (2004) (for more recent analysis and cases); Jennifer DeCook Hatchett, 
Kansas Felony Murder: Agency or Proximate Cause, 48 Kan. L. Rev. 1047 (2000); James Hillard, 
Felony Murder in Illinois: The ‘Agency Theory’ vs. The ‘Proximate Cause Theory’: The Debate Con-
tinues, 25 S. Ill. U. L.J. 331 (2001); Clayton T. Tanaka & Larry M. Lawrence II, Developments in 
California Homicide Law: The Felony-Murder Doctrine, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1479 (2003). 
 5. See Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional 
Crossroads, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 446, 478 (1985) (arguing that the rule should be held unconstitutional).   
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D were in a conspiracy to rob the banks, and if C committed murder in 
furtherance of that conspiracy, then A, B, and D are all also guilty of mur-
der, as long as they could reasonably have foreseen that such an event 
would occur in the course of their conspiracy.  They could all be guilty of 
first degree murder, even though A, B, and D never met the bank guard, 
never assisted or encouraged C to kill him, never wanted C to kill him or 
knew C would kill him, and never even visited the bank or entered the state 
in which the bank was located! 
The rule by which this result is reached, called the Pinkerton rule, is 
one of the most controversial doctrines in modern criminal law.  Broadly 
stated, the rule is that “any conspirator in a continuing conspiracy is re-
sponsible for the illegal acts committed by his cohorts in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, within the scope of the conspiracy, and reasonably foreseeable 
by the conspirators as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful 
agreement.” 6  This rule permits conviction of a crime that the accused did 
not intend, plan, want, or even know about, committed against a victim 
whom the defendant did not know or want to harm.7  The rule applies 
throughout the life of the conspiracy to all who originally agreed to join the 
conspiracy, unless the defendant overtly acted to disavow and/or defeat the 
conspiracy.8  
  
 6. James M. Branden, White Collar Crime: Fourth Survey of Law: Substantive Crimes, 24 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 459, 485 (1987). 
 7. Fletcher, supra n. 2, at 171.  See also Anderson v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 2d. 22, 24-25 
(Cal. 1947) (holding that defendant’s action of referring women to an abortionist made her guilty of 
twenty seven other abortions performed by that abortionist, even on women who were not known to the 
defendant); Jon May, Pinkerton v. United States Revisited: A Defense of Accomplice Liability, 8 Nova 
L.J. 21, 23 (1983) (“a party to a conspiracy may be prosecuted for the substantive crimes of a co-
conspirator, committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, even though the person did not participate in 
the crime and even if he did not intend for that specific crime to occur”). 
 8. Lisa G. Stark, Criminal Law: The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine Is Not a Natu-
ral Result for New Mexico - State v. Carrasco, 28 N.M. L. Rev. 505, 515 (1998).  In such a case of 
withdrawal, the defendant would, however, still be guilty of conspiracy, on the rationale that this crime 
was complete with the agreement itself.  David, supra n. 2, at 982 n. 239.  It was in Hyde v. U.S., that 
the Supreme Court established the principle that withdrawal from a conspiracy requires an affirmative 
act on the part of the defendant.  Hyde v. U.S., 225 U.S. 347, 369 (1912) (stating that defendant is still 
guilty of conspiracy “until he does some act to disavow or defeat the purpose of the conspiracy”); see 
also Paul S. Berra, Jr., Co-Conspirator Liability Under 18 U.S.C. 924(C): Is It Possible To Escape?, 
1996 Wis. L. Rev. 603, 607 (1996) (stating that the “criminal intent for each of the substantive acts is 
established at” the formation of the conspiracy); Developments in the Law, supra n. 1, at 957.  Interest-
ing arguments about the dangerous combination of the Hyde withdrawal doctrine and Pinkerton have 
also been made.  See Vicarious Liability For Criminal Offenses of Co-Conspirators, 56 Yale L.J. 371, 
378 (1947) (“While there is justification for the stringent requirement of an affirmative act of with-
drawal on the charge of conspiracy, . . . the operation of that rule in conjunction with vicarious criminal 
liability may well leave a former conspirator, innocent of all connection with subsequent crimes, de-
fenseless.”). 
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The Pinkerton rule “is not universally followed.”9  It is rejected in the 
Model Penal Code.10  Many state courts have interpreted their statutes to 
require more than membership in a conspiracy for complicity in substan-
tive crimes committed in the course of that conspiracy.11  Commentary on 
Pinkerton in the academic world, much like commentary on felony murder 
and on conspiracy in general, is overwhelmingly negative.12  On the con-
trary, this article argues that the Pinkerton doctrine, far from being an aber-
ration, is rather more an illustration of our existing criminal law and of 
some of the important theoretical assumptions behind it. 
Understanding Pinkerton is important because it remains good law in 
the federal system13 and in a considerable number of states.14  The rule, it 
  
 9. William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1903, 1950 n. 
115 (1993). The courts of North Carolina and New York have rejected the doctrine. State v. Small, 272 
S.E.2d 128, 135 (N.C. 1980); People v. McGee, 399 N.E.2d 1177, 1182 (N.Y. 1979).  Massachusetts 
has apparently never adopted the doctrine.  See Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 206 N.E.2d 672, 680 (Mass. 
1965) (declining to adopt the Pinkerton doctrine).  Other states have, in the past, rejected the Pinkerton 
doctrine by statute.  Richard Bonnie et al., Criminal Law 623 (Foundation Press 1997) (citing Ala. 
Code §§ 13A-4-3(f), 13A-2-23 (2003); 17-A Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 151 (2005); N.D. Cent. Code § 
12.1-03-01 (2003)).  See also LaFave 2003, supra n. 3, at 685 (“opposition to it has grown significantly 
in recent years”); Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes 693 
(7th ed., Aspen Publishers 2001) (“In accord with the Model Penal Code, most jurisdictions currently 
hold, either by statute or by judicial decision, that conspirators are liable for substantive crimes of their 
co-conspirators only when the strict conditions for accomplice liability are met.”). 
 10. Model Penal Code § 2.06 cmt. (a) (ALI 1985) (declining to follow the Pinkerton Rule). 
 11. See Dale E. Bennett & Cheney C. Joseph, Jr., The Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942 – Doctrinal 
Provisions, Defenses, and Theories of Culpability, 52 La. L. Rev. 1083, 1099 (1992) (expressing the 
view that “the so-called ‘Pinkerton Doctrine’ may have no force in Louisiana”) see Commonwealth v. 
Perry, 256 N.E.2d 745, 747 (Mass. 1970) (another Massachusetts case rejecting Pinkerton); see gener-
ally Rollin M. Perkins, The Act of One Conspirator, 26 Hastings L.J. 337, 340 n. 16 (1974). 
 12. See e.g. LaFave & Scott 1986, supra n. 3, at 589; Model Penal Code § 2.06 cmt. (a); Berra, Jr., 
supra n. 8, at 622-23; Developments in the Law, supra n. 1, at 998; Liability for Co-Conspirators’ 
Crimes in the Wisconsin Party to a Crime Statute, 66 Marq. L. Rev. 344, 366 (1983); Vicarious Liabil-
ity, supra n. 8, at 377; Wayne LaFave & Austin Scott, Handbook of Criminal Law 515 (West 1972); 
LaFave 2003, supra n. 3, at 684-85 (discussing more recent criticism).  
 13. See e.g. Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking? The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor 
and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1341, 1426 (2002) (calling the Pinkerton 
doctrine “well established”).  See also Nye & Nissen v. U.S., 336 U.S. 613, 618 (1949) (reaffirming 
Pinkerton).  More recent cases also support this proposition.  E.g. U.S. v. Newsome, 322 F. 3d 328, 338 
(4th Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Wade, 318 F. 3d 698, 701 (6th Cir. 2003) (expressing the continued view that a 
defendant is liable for all the crimes of his co-conspirators if done in furtherance of the conspiracy and 
if reasonably foreseeable).  See also Christine Fisher, Comment: Conspiring to Violate the Lacey Act, 
32 Envtl. L. 475, 495 n. 273 (2002) (pointing out that the only significant limitation on Pinkerton today 
is that “if there is insufficient evidence to prove conspiracy, conviction of any substantive counts using 
the Pinkerton rule cannot stand”).  See Kelly Elaine Lochman, Note: Who Brought the Kid? United 
States v. McClain And the Application of Sentencing Enhancements When Use of a Minor in a Con-
certed Criminal Activity Was Foreseeable, 36 Ga. L. Rev. 863, 867-68 (2002) (“the Pinkerton doctrine 
is now frequently used by most courts to hold defendants liable for their co-conspirators’ foreseeable 
acts, though some courts have limited its application.”).  Most courts “have chosen to apply [Pinkerton] 
even when there is only slight evidence connecting the defendant to the conspiracy.” Id. at 878.  
“Courts have generally embraced the notion of holding co-conspirators liable for the foreseeable acts of 
others in furtherance of a conspiracy, and have recognized that this does not result in unwarranted strict 
liability.” Id. at 892.  The argument of this article by Lochman is that, because of the “analogy . . . 
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has been said, “is applied in an enormous number of prosecutions.”15  For 
example, one commentator has recently argued that the Pinkerton doctrine 
“may likely aid the United States government in prosecuting a figure like 
Zacarias Moussaoui, who was behind bars in a Minneapolis jail at the time 
of 9/11.”  Under Pinkerton, it would not be necessary to prove that Mous-
saoui “knew every member of the conspiracy, that he was aware of the end 
result of the conspiracy, or that he took any steps toward achieving the plot 
– only that he could reasonably have foreseen that people would be 
killed.”16 
When LaFave and Scott published their often-cited Handbook on 
Criminal Law in 1972, they noted that the Pinkerton doctrine had “never 
gained broad acceptance.”  Eleven years later in an article in the Nova Law 
Journal in 1983, Jon May concluded that this “assertion is no longer cor-
rect.”17  Since the early 1970s, according to May, the rule has been used 
with increasing frequency, especially in narcotics cases18 and appears to 
have become largely “entrenched” in federal law.19  In a recent book, Pro-
  
between the results in Pinkerton and in McClain,” the Eleventh Circuit was correct to conclude, in 
McClain, that a section 3B1.4 sentence enhancement is proper “if the defendant should have foreseen 
the use of a minor in the commission of a crime.” Id. at 892-93.  See also Beth Allison Davis & Josh 
Vitullo, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 777 (2001); Raphael Prober & Jill Ran-
dall, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 39 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 571, 584, 601 (2002) (repeating the rule that 
“the reasonably foreseeable overt acts of one co-conspirator committed in furtherance of the conspiracy 
are attributed to the other conspirators,” but noting that “some courts have attempted to limit Pinkerton 
liability”).  See Katyal, supra n. 2; Danger in Numbers: Why It Makes Sense To Have Harsh Punish-
ments for Conspiracy, 2003 APR Legal Aff. 44, 46 (2003) (serving as more recent evidence of 
Pinkerton’s continued vitality). Case law is also supportive.  See e.g. U.S. v. Richards, 204 F.3d 177, 
210 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that use of mail in an investment scheme was reasonably foreseeable thus 
triggering Pinkerton analysis); U.S.  v. Ciccono, 219 F. 3d 1078, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2000).  See Paul H. 
Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 Yale L.J. 609, 676 n. 240 (1984) (an older account of 
Pinkerton’s relevance).  See also U.S. v. Castaneda, 16 F.3d 1504, 1511 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that 
federal courts use the Pinkerton doctrine to “punish conspiracy and the offenses that are its object”).  
See generally Anderson & Bertron, supra n. 2, at 755 n. 59; LaFave & Scott 1986, supra n. 3, at 589; 
Peter Low et al., Criminal Law: Cases and Materials, 476-77 (2d ed., Foundation Press 1986).  
 14. See Kadish, supra n. 9, at 693 (“several state courts continue to subject co-conspirators to vi-
carious liability under Pinkerton”).  For case law, see e.g. State v. Walton, 630 A.2d 990, 998 (Conn. 
1993) (upholding a Pinkerton instruction).  See also Jennifer Walwyn, Targeting Gang Crime: An 
Analysis of Calif. Penal Code Section 12022.53 and Vicarious Liability for Gang Members, 50 UCLA 
L. Rev. 685, 689-90 (2002) (arguing that the “Pinkerton doctrine can be used to prosecute gang mem-
bers because gangs are a quintessential example of group criminality” and describing the Pinkerton 
doctrine as “incredibly broad” and requiring “very little definite participation for [the defendant] to be 
vicariously liable”); Stuntz,. supra n. 9, at 1956 n. 115 (Pinkerton “remains good law in the federal 
system and in a large number of states”); Low et al., supra n. 13, at 476-77 (recognizing on-going 
vitality of Pinkerton); Lloyd L.Weinreb, Criminal Law: Cases, Comments, Questions, 671 (6th ed., 
Foundation Press 1998) (arguing that “the Pinkerton rule has been accepted in some but not all states”). 
 15. Marcus, supra n. 2, at 6. 
 16. Robbins, supra n. 2, at 3; see also John Gibeaut, Prosecuting Moussaoui, 88 A.B.A. J. 36 (2002) 
(discussing efforts to prosecute Zacarias Moussaoui). 
 17. May, supra n. 7, at 21 n. 6. 
 18. Id. at 21. 
 19. Id. at n. 6.   
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fessor Joshua Dressler says that the Pinkerton doctrine, “adopted in the 
federal courts, is the majority rule in states that have considered the is-
sue.”20  In short, as one commentator has observed, in many courts in the 
United States, “a conspirator can be held responsible for crimes committed 
by her co-conspirators as long as such crimes were in furtherance of the 
agreement and were reasonably foreseeable.”21  
The “reasonably foreseeable” component of the Pinkerton doctrine in 
effect imputes criminal liability for what the Model Penal Code calls neg-
ligence.22  A person is guilty of another co-conspirator’s crime, under 
Pinkerton, if it was “reasonably foreseeable.”  In other words, it does not 
matter whether the defendant himself, subjectively, actually foresaw this 
crime.  What matters is only whether a reasonable person, objectively, 
would have foreseen it.  The defendant is guilty even if he did not know 
there was a risk that this crime would be committed if he “should have 
known” of that risk when he agreed to be a conspirator.23 
There can be no question that the Pinkerton doctrine has prompted vi-
tuperative criticism.24  The President of the National Association of Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyers, an organization with 25,000 members, for example, 
had this to say against the rule: 
[T]he Pinkerton doctrine permits the government to hold a defen-
dant criminally responsible for all reasonably foreseeable acts of 
co-conspirators regardless of actual knowledge, intent, or partici-
pation.  Thus, if the government cannot prove a defendant guilty 
on various substantive charges, it need only convince the jury of 
the defendant’s guilt of conspiracy to secure convictions on the 
otherwise unsupportable substantive charges.25  
  
 20. Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, 488 (3d ed., Lexis 2001).  Even LaFave, who 
insists in his 2003 text that the rule “has never gained broad acceptance,” is forced to concede that “this 
is not to suggest that what might be called the Pinkerton rule has not had an impact upon the law of 
accomplice liability.  The Pinkerton approach has been used . . . by courts in establishing a basis for 
finding that the defendant was accountable for crimes directly attributed to another.” LaFave 2003, 
supra n. 3, at 684-85.  It also “appears to have been included within some statutes defining accomplice 
liability.”  Id.  
 21. Marcus, supra n. 2, at 6; see Bonnie et al., supra n. 9, at 623 (for a recent view that “the 
Pinkerton rule is probably the law in a majority of American jurisdictions”); Lochman, supra n. 13, at 
867-68 (stating that most courts follow Pinkerton).   
 22. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (ALI 1985). 
 23. Marcus, supra n. 2, at 7 n. 28. 
 24. But it helps make conspiracy popular among prosecutors.  See Charles P. Bubany, Fifth Circuit 
Survey: June 1994 – May 1995: Criminal Law, 27 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 655, 658 (1996) (“The offense 
[of conspiracy] is appealing for a number of reasons, not the least of which is its usefulness in fixing 
guilt for substantive offenses as well as for conspiracy.”). 
 25. Marcus, supra n. 2, at 7 (citing Letter from Jeff Weiner, President of National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers (Feb. 1991)); see Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpin-
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Convicting one person of any crime committed by another is difficult 
to justify, given the law’s preference for individual rather than collective or 
associational guilt and given the independence of each person’s will.26  It is 
even more difficult to countenance when there is no proof that the con-
victed person was even subjectively aware of a risk that this crime would 
occur.27  And this doctrine seems most strained when it is applied, as it has 
been, to convict one person of a murder committed by someone else based 
on such negligent perception of risk.28 
Murder, of course, is the most horrific of crimes.  Conviction of mur-
der can result in imprisonment for life or, in some states, even the death 
penalty.  Is it fair to permit a person to be convicted of murder because he 
should have perceived a risk that another person – perhaps someone he 
never met – might kill someone else?  Is murder based on this negligence 
theory defensible?  These are important questions to which an analysis of 
the Pinkerton doctrine gives rise. 
This article examines the Pinkerton doctrine in general and, more pre-
cisely, its application to permit one person to be convicted of murder 
through negligent failure to perceive a risk that another person would kill.  
Part II of the article examines in detail the 1946 case of Pinkerton v. 
United States, which, though not a murder case, developed the Pinkerton 
doctrine of conspiratorial liability.  After analyzing the arguments of the 
majority and the dissent by Justice Rutledge criticizing the majority’s new 
rule and reasoning – criticism echoed in much of the scholarly literature – 
we move, in Part III, to a review of a number of post Pinkerton cases in 
which the doctrine has been expanded beyond the original holding.  Spe-
cial attention will be given to those cases in which co-conspirators have 
been found guilty of murder in conspiracies where murder was not the 
original object or plan.  
  
nings, 37 Hastings L.J. 91, 93 (1992) (arguing that accomplice liability rules, like Pinkerton, “may be 
unjust . . . because . . . they are not tied to the doctrine of causation”). 
 26. See Dressler, supra n. 25, at 140 (stressing the “focus upon individual culpability” underlying 
our “common-law rules of crimes”). 
 27. See Berra, Jr., supra n. 8, at 603 (suggesting that Pinkerton’s “‘reasonable foreseeability’ stan-
dard offers little meaningful protection to unknowing co-conspirators” and thus the courts should adopt 
“an alternative standard, a ‘practical certainty’ standard, which focuses on the actual culpability of each 
co-conspirator”). 
 28. The word negligence is used in this article in the way the Model Penal Code does in § 2.02: “A 
person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.” (em-
phasis added).  In Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 136-37 (Oxford 
University Press, 1968) [hereinafter Hart, Punishment], H.L.A. Hart speaks of “inadvertent negli-
gence,” which he defines as “unthinking carelessness” and which he distinguishes from recklessness, 
“that is, wittingly flying in the face of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, or the conscious creation of 
such a risk.”  
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Part IV sets the rule in context by contrasting it with the law of causa-
tion and with both the Model Penal Code and “natural and probable conse-
quences” approaches to complicity.  Part V of the article examines the 
merits of criminalizing negligent killing as murder.  The discussion in-
cludes a revisiting of Holmes’s familiar argument in favor of an objective 
(negligence) standard in murder (and manslaughter) prosecutions, as well 
as an assessment of more recent attempts to come to terms with the subjec-
tive/objective debate in criminal homicide cases.  Part VI concludes with 
thoughts on the uniqueness of the Pinkerton doctrine and what if anything 
can and should be done about its perceived unfairness.  Taken as a whole, 
the argument is that, even when broadly applied to crimes that were not 
original objectives of the conspiracy but were reasonably foreseeable, 
Pinkerton is not an aberration in the law.  Instead, it is consistent with the 
way the law has been and with the way it should continue to be interpreted.  
II.  THE PINKTERTON CASE 
A. Facts of the Case and Majority Opinion 
Walter and Daniel Pinkerton were two bootlegging brothers who lived 
a short distance away from each other on Daniel Pinkerton’s farm.29  They 
were indicted for “crimes concerned with unlawful possession, transporta-
tion, and dealing in whiskey, in fraud of the federal revenues.”30  More 
specifically, each brother was charged with conspiracy to violate the Inter-
nal Revenue Code and with several substantive violations of the Code.  
Each was convicted by a jury of the one conspiracy count and of several of 
the substantive offenses.31 
Affirming the convictions, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit noted that the conspiracy could be inferred from a number of 
factors: the close proximity of the two brothers’ houses, the brothers’ fre-
quent association with each other, and the many cases in which both had 
previously been convicted of liquor law violations.  There was even evi-
dence that, on one occasion, Walter Pinkerton had drawn a gun on investi-
gators and threatened to kill the sheriff who was searching the farm.  
Moreover, more than once, Daniel had posted bond for Walter when Wal-
ter had been arrested on state charges in Alabama.32 
  
 29. Pinkerton v. U.S., 328 U.S. 640, 641 (1946). 
 30. Id. at 648 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).   
 31. Id. at 641. 
 32. Tripp, Margins of the Mob: A Comparison of Reeves v. Ernst and Young with Criminal Associa-
tion Laws in Italy and France, 20 Fordham Intl. L.J. 263, 272 n. 72 (1996). 
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The Pinkerton brothers appealed their convictions to the United States 
Supreme Court.33  Daniel Pinkerton’s first contention was that there was 
insufficient evidence to connect him to the conspiracy.  Justice Douglas, 
writing the opinion of the Court, rejected this argument summarily, saying 
“there was enough evidence for submission of the issue to the jury.”34  In 
so doing, Douglas followed the traditional approach in conspiracy cases, 
which often relies on circumstantial evidence to find the actus reus – that 
is to say, the agreement – of conspiracy.35  
Both brothers also argued that the substantive convictions should have 
merged with the conspiracy conviction and that only a single sentence not 
exceeding the maximum permitted by the conspiracy statute should have 
been imposed.36  Justice Douglas quickly dismissed this contention as well: 
The common law rule that the substantive offense, if a felony, was 
merged in the conspiracy has little vitality in this country.  It has 
been long and consistently recognized by the Court that the com-
mission of the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it 
are separate and distinct offenses.37   
A conspiracy, Douglas said, quoting earlier cases, “has ingredients, as 
well as implications, distinct from the completion of the unlawful project.”  
It was, in short, altogether proper for the jury to have convicted the two 
brothers of conspiracy to defraud the IRS and of substantive violations 
which were the objects of the conspiracy.38 
The main issue before the Supreme Court in considering Daniel 
Pinkerton’s appeal was not the conspiracy charge.  Rather, it was Daniel’s 
conviction on the substantive counts.39  There was, as Douglas noted, “no 
evidence that Daniel participated directly in the commission of the substan-
tive offenses on which his conviction” was sustained.40  On the contrary, 
  
 33. Both brothers appealed, but Daniel’s contentions prompted the Court’s formulation of the 
“Pinkerton Doctrine.”  Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 642.  
 34. Id. at 645. 
 35. See e.g. Johnson, supra n. 2, at 1142 n. 17 (arguing that the “existence of the agreement need not 
be proved directly, but may be implied from proof of concerted action by the defendants”); Develop-
ments in the Law, supra n. 1, at 1008 n. 33 (arguing that, in Sherman Act prosecutions, a “conspiracy 
conviction will lie even when no act has occurred resembling a direct expression of the agreement”). 
 36. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 642. 
 37. Id. at 643. 
 38. See David, supra n. 2, at 980-81 (stating that courts in Britain abolished the merger doctrine, 
which had been a long-standing common law principle, as early as 1844).  It was not until the 
Pinkerton case in the middle of the twentieth century, however, that the American Supreme Court made 
a similar pronouncement, although the Court, in cases before Pinkerton, had consistently found the 
doctrine of merger inapplicable.  Id. 
 39. Vicarious Liability, supra n. 8, at 372 n. 11 (“Although both defendants appealed, the only 
serious contention of error was Dan’s sentence on the substantive crimes.”). 
 40. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 645. 
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Daniel Pinkerton was in jail on other charges when some of the crimes 
were committed.41 
Daniel had not been indicted as an aider and abettor and his case had 
not been submitted to the jury on an aiding and abetting theory.42  Instead, 
the trial judge had instructed the jury that, in the Supreme Court’s words, 
each petitioner could be found guilty of the substantive offenses, if 
it was found at the time those offenses were committed petitioners 
were parties to an unlawful conspiracy and the substantive offenses 
charged were in fact committed in furtherance of it.43    
In other words, if Daniel and Walter were in a conspiracy to defraud 
the IRS and Walter committed specific acts of fraud in furtherance of that 
conspiracy, Daniel was equally guilty of those crimes.44 
On appeal, Daniel Pinkerton argued that this jury instruction had been 
erroneous.  He cited the Third Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Sall, 
where it had been held that mere participation in a conspiracy was not suf-
ficient to sustain convictions for substantive crimes committed in further-
ance of that conspiracy and that direct participation in the commission of 
the offenses was a prerequisite to such convictions.45  
Ruling that the trial judge’s instruction in the Pinkerton case was cor-
rect and rejecting the reasoning in Sall, the Supreme Court affirmed Daniel 
Pinkerton’s convictions and held “that evidence of direct participation in 
the commission of substantive offenses was not necessary.”46  In other 
words, the Court ruled that a conspirator may be held guilty of substantive 
crimes committed by his co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy 
even if he did not participate in those offenses and even if there is no evi-
dence that he even had knowledge of them.47  
  
 41. Id. at 648. 
 42. Id. at 645 n. 6. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id.  The precise words of the trial judge’s charge were as follows:  “if you are satisfied . . . that 
at the time these particular substantive offenses were committed . . . that the two defendants were in an 
unlawful conspiracy . . . then you would have a right . . . to convict each of these defendants on all 
these substantive counts, provided the acts referred to in the substantive counts were acts in furtherance 
of the unlawful conspiracy.”  Id. 
 45. Id. at 646; see James M. Shellow et al., Pinkerton v. United States and Vicarious Criminal 
Liability, 36 Mercer L. Rev. 1079, 1081 (1985) (explaining the substantive basis of Daniel Pinkerton’s 
appeal). 
 46. LaFave 2003, supra n. 3, at 684. 
 47. See Bubany, supra n. 24, at 658. 
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B. The Dissent 
The Supreme Court decision in Pinkerton v. United States was not 
unanimous.  Justice Rutledge began his now-famous dissent by saying that 
the majority opinion was “without precedent” and “a dangerous precedent 
to establish.”48  He made three main arguments against the majority’s rule 
and reasoning. 
First, Rutledge said, Daniel Pinkerton had not aided and abetted these 
substantive crimes: 
The proof showed that Walter alone committed the substantive 
crimes.  There was none to establish that Daniel participated in 
them, aided and abetted Walter in committing them, or knew that 
he had done so . . . [t]here was no evidence that he counseled, ad-
vised, or had knowledge of those particular acts or offenses.49 
The only evidence against Daniel Pinkerton, Rutledge averred, was 
that he had “confederated” with his brother over the years “to commit simi-
lar crimes concerned with unlawful possession, transportation, and dealing 
in whiskey, in fraud of the federal revenues.”50  In other words, in 
Rutledge’s view, “Daniel had been held guilty of the substantive crimes 
committed only by Walter on proof that he did no more than conspire with 
him to commit offenses of the same general character.”51 
Why was it so bad to have convicted Daniel Pinkerton of these crimes 
without proof that he had aided and abetted them?  For Rutledge, the 
Court’s opinion confused the three classes of crime which Congress had, 
by statute, separately defined: “(1) completed substantive offenses; (2) 
aiding, abetting, or counseling another to commit them; and (3) conspiracy 
to commit them.”52  These three classes of crime should be kept distinct, 
Rutledge said: 
The gist of conspiracy is the agreement; that of aiding, abetting, or 
counseling is in consciously advising or assisting another to com-
mit particular offenses, and thus  becoming a party to them; that of 
substantive crime, going a step beyond aiding, abetting, counseling 
to completion of the offense.53 
  
 48. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 648 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. at 648, 651. 
 50. Id. at 648. 
 51. Id. at 651. 
 52. Id. at 649. 
 53. Id. at 649. 
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Second, Rutledge argued that convicting Daniel Pinkerton of both con-
spiracy and the substantive crimes in this case amounted to double jeop-
ardy.54  This is not because of the discredited rule of merger, which would 
always bar conviction of both conspiracy and substantive crimes which are 
the objects of the conspiracy.  In fact, Rutledge dismissed the defendants’ 
merger argument as quickly as Douglas did, saying that the “old doctrine 
of merger of conspiracy in the substantive crime has not obtained here.”55  
Rather, Rutledge said, this case presents “the substance if not the technical 
effect of double jeopardy” because under these facts Daniel was being pun-
ished twice for agreeing to commit a crime.  If there had been evidence of 
aiding and abetting the substantive crimes, conviction of these crimes and 
of conspiracy to commit them might be possible.  But without evidence of 
aiding and abetting, the court was punishing Daniel Pinkerton twice for the 
same thing – for having “agreed with Walter at some past time to engage in 
such transactions generally.”56  As to Daniel Pinkerton, Rutledge said, “this 
was only evidence of conspiracy, not of substantive crime.”57  It was, in 
other words, evidence of one crime only, not of two.  In short, in 
Rutledge’s view, without the agreement, Daniel was guilty of no crime in 
this record.  With it and no more, so far as his own conduct is concerned, 
“he was guilty of two.”58  
Third, Rutledge condemned the majority opinion for importing the 
concept of vicarious liability into criminal law.  Rejecting the “analogies 
from private commercial law and the law of torts” as “dangerous . . . for 
transfer to the criminal field,” Rutledge found the Court’s holding resulted 
in “a vicarious criminal responsibility as broad as, or broader than, the vi-
carious civil liability of a partner for acts done by a co-partner in the course 
of the firm’s business.”59  
C. Critique of the Dissent 
Are Rutledge’s three main criticisms in Pinkerton valid?  On the issue 
of aiding and abetting, the majority admitted that there was “no evidence to 
show that Daniel participated directly [emphasis added] in the commission 
of the substantive offenses” with which he was charged.60  And yet, the 
Court seemed to indicate that the rationale for its holding was entirely con-
  
 54. Id. at 651-52. 
 55. Id. at 650. 
 56. Id. at 651. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 652. 
 59. Id. at 651. 
 60. Id. at 645. 
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sistent with the rationale behind the law of complicity: “the rule which 
holds responsible one who counsels, procures, or commands another to 
commit a crime is founded on the same general principle.”61  
Moreover, can it really be said that Daniel did not aid and abet these 
crimes?  Surely the fact that he was in jail and not physically present when 
the crimes were committed is wholly irrelevant to his liability as an ac-
complice.62  As early as 1930 in a Harvard Law Review essay on “Criminal 
Responsibility for the Acts of Another,” Francis Sayre pointed out that 
“one who counsels, procures, or commands the commission of a felony 
through a guilty agent but who is himself absent from the crime has from 
very early times been punishable.”63  This principle can be traced to Anglo-
Saxon law, as well as to the time of Bracton.64 
But, there was no evidence that Daniel actually commanded or even 
counseled his brother to commit these specific crimes in this way and at 
this time.  Does this matter to accomplice liability?  It is well settled in the 
law of complicity that a person can be criminally liable “even though [his] 
agent committed the act through a different instrumentality, or at a differ-
ent time, or in a different place from that ordered or authorized.”65   
What did Daniel Pinkerton do to aid and abet these crimes? All he did, 
it is said, was to agree with his brother to commit crimes of that general 
nature.  But why can agreeing not be sufficient for aiding and abetting?  
The Supreme Court case of Hicks v. U.S.,66 among many other cases, es-
tablished that the actus reus of aiding and abetting “may include shouting 
words of encouragement, acting as a lookout, or merely being present and 
ready to aid the perpetrator if necessary.”67  If a person can be an accom-
plice by merely telling the principal that he is willing to help, how is it that 
Daniel Pinkerton was not an accomplice by agreeing with his brother to 
commit such crimes?  In other words, why can’t proof of conspiracy be 
proof of complicity?68  
  
 61. Id. at 647. 
 62. See May, supra n. 7, at 25 (“Frequently a principal in the first degree is present at the time that 
an offense is committed.  Presence, however, is not required.  If A employs a child to pass a counterfeit 
check, or if A leaves poison for another who subsequently drinks it, A is considered a principal in the 
first degree under a theory of constructive presence.”). 
 63. Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 694 
(1930) (citing F.W. Maitland and Frederick Pollock’s famous two-volumed history: Pollock & Mait-
land, 2 History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, 509 (2d ed., University Press 1959) [here-
inafter Pollock & Maitland] and Sir James FitzJames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of Eng-
land, 231 et seq. (MacMillan 1883)). 
 64. Id. at 696 n. 29 (citing Pollock & Maitland). 
 65. Id. at 702-03.  
 66. 150 U.S. 442 (1890). 
 67. Grace Mueller, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2169, 2170 (1998). 
 68. See Perkins, supra n. 11, at 340 (assessing the differences of complicity and conspiracy and the 
argument that, despite “this possibility of separate existence, . . . complicity and conspiracy normally 
 
File: Pauley (macro) Created on:  12/19/2005 11:59:00 PM Last Printed: 12/20/2005 12:30:00 AM 
14 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 4, No. 1   
If Daniel Pinkerton did aid and abet the substantive crimes by his 
agreement, why is it double jeopardy to charge him with both conspiracy 
and the substantive crimes themselves?  Unless we are abolishing the 
crime of conspiracy, or applying the merger rule to bar all prosecutions of 
both conspiracy and the object crimes – a solution which neither the major-
ity nor the dissent in Pinkerton were ready to adopt – it is unpersuasive to 
speak of double jeopardy here. 
Rutledge’s most serious criticism is his accusation that the Court is 
adopting a theory of vicarious liability.  This criticism of the Pinkerton 
case has been echoed by many others.69  In a 1985 article, for instance, 
Professor Shellow and his colleagues stated categorically that, in the 
Pinkerton case, “the Supreme Court imported the civil concept of vicarious 
liability into the American law of criminal conspiracy.”70  The view that 
Pinkerton adopts a new vicarious liability also informed the Model Penal 
Code’s rejection of the Pinkerton doctrine as offensive to the law’s “sense 
of just proportion.”71  
Pinkerton’s majority opinion does strongly suggest that adoption of the 
tort standard of vicarious liability is the Court’s objective.  The Court 
draws analogies to agency law,72 pointing out that the “overt act of one 
partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically di-
rected to that act.”73  The same rationale should apply to conspiracy, the 
Court says.  As “long as the partnership in crime continues, the partners act 
for each other in carrying it forward.”74  After all, it is well settled that the 
overt act of one conspirator is the act of all for purposes of proving the 
actus reus of the conspiracy itself.  “If that can be supplied by the act of 
one conspirator, we fail to see why the same or other acts in furtherance of 
  
go hand-in-hand”).  Perkins quotes from Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in U.S. v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 
579, 581 (2d Cir. 1940), in which Hand says that “a conspirator with” another to commit a crime is “in 
substance the same thing, an abettor” of that crime.  Perkins, supra n. 11, at 340 n. 21; see also 
Bubany, supra n. 24, at 658 (“The evidence needed to support a conspiracy conviction typically will 
support an aiding and abetting conviction.”). 
 69. See e.g. May, supra n. 7, at 23 (“Critics have argued that the rationale of Pinkerton represents an 
unwarranted extension of the civil doctrine of respondeat superior into criminal jurisprudence.”).  May 
also says that such critics “misinterpret the case as having announced a doctrine of liability predicated 
upon one’s mere membership in a conspiracy.”  Id. at 38; see also Shellow, supra n. 45, at 1085 (refer-
ring to “Pinkerton’s effective, though mercifully limited, recognition of the principle of guilt by asso-
ciation”); Vicarious Liability, supra n. 8, at 376 (arguing that what is new in the Pinkerton case is the 
“imposition of vicarious liability for substantive offenses committed by co-conspirators”). 
 70. Shellow, supra n. 45, at 1080. 
 71. See Model Penal Code § 2.06 cmt. (a).   
 72. See Shellow, supra n. 45, at 1084 (“Agency jargon and agency concepts had been a routine 
feature of conspiracy opinions for decades prior to Pinkerton.”). 
 73. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646-47. 
 74. Id. at 646. 
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the conspiracy are likewise not attributable to the others for the purpose of 
holding them responsible for the substantive offense.”75  
The analogy between the overt act requirement for proof of conspiracy 
and the use of overt acts of one conspirator to hold another conspirator 
guilty of substantive crimes was sharply criticized in a 1959 article on 
“Criminal Conspiracy”: 
An act committed before the defendant joined the conspiracy is 
sufficient to supply the necessary requirement of an overt act as to 
him.  Yet, if that act was a crime, it is difficult to believe that a 
court would hold the defendant liable for it. Furthermore, even if 
the overt act has any practical importance in determining the de-
fendant’s liability for conspiracy, it is not attributed to each defen-
dant personally in order to hold him responsible for its effects, but 
is rather meant to show something concerning the grouping as a 
whole–either that the grouping existed, or that it had reached a 
stage of development dangerous to society. Thus, the defendant’s 
punishment as a conspirator does not vary with the seriousness of 
the overt act proved in establishing his guilt.  Moreover, a court 
should hesitate to draw an analogy to the overt act to impute liabil-
ity for a substantive crime if only because this is likely to entail far 
more serious criminal consequences.76   
On the other hand, the Pinkerton rationale has strong precedent.  In 
1827, Justice Story, speaking for the Supreme Court, may be said to have 
anticipated the Pinkerton doctrine when he said that “the act of one con-
spirator . . . is considered the act of all, and is evidence against all.  Each is 
deemed to consent to, or command, what is done by any other in further-
ance of the common object.”77  This rule “has been repeated by the Court 
down through the years.”78 
What, then, was new in the Pinkerton case?  For Justice Rutledge and 
the other Pinkerton critics, the new development was the Court’s explicit 
willingness to adopt the vicarious liability doctrine in criminal law and to 
impose such vicarious liability “solely upon evidence that the defendant 
was a conspirator.”79  
Rutledge and the other critics are quite right to point out that, if 
Pinkerton and any other cases adopted a broad vicarious liability theory for 
the whole of criminal law, this would be a significant departure from tradi-
  
 75. Id. at 647. 
 76. Developments in the Law, supra n. 1, at 998. 
 77. U.S. v. Goodling, 25 U.S. 460, 469 (1827). 
 78. See e.g. Hyde v. U.S., 225 U.S. 347, 359 (1912); Logan v. U.S., 144 U.S. 263, 308-09 (1892). 
 79. Developments in the Law, supra n. 1, at 993. 
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tion.  Francis Sayre makes this clear in his previously cited 1930 essay on 
“Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another.”  Tracing the tort con-
cept of respondeat superior back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
Sayre stresses that no comparable rule developed in criminal law.  In fact, 
Sayre says, the doctrine was expressly repudiated in a 1730 English case, 
Rex v. Huggins.  There, the defendant Huggins, warden of the fleet, was 
charged with the murder of one of the prisoners in his charge.  The servant 
of Huggins’ deputy warden had transferred the prisoner to an unhealthy 
cell, where he had died of disease.  The court held that, although the ser-
vant was guilty, Huggins, the warden, was not:  
It is a point not to be disputed that in criminal cases the principal is 
not answerable for the act of the deputy, as he is in civil cases; they 
must each answer for their own acts, and stand or fall by their own 
behaviour.80  
Sayre concludes that this and other cases “have made it clear that . . . 
the doctrine of respondeat superior will not serve as a ground of criminal 
liability.”81  
The reasons are plain.  Criminal law is based on the idea that guilt is 
personal and individual.  Vicarious liability by definition means that one is 
automatically responsible for the torts of another because of one’s status 
relationship to that other person as principal and agent. An employer is 
vicariously liable for the torts of his employee, committed in the course of 
the employment, because of his status as employer and regardless of 
whether he encouraged or even knew about the tortious behavior.82  Based 
on these assumptions, “any doctrine of vicarious criminal liability is re-
pugnant to common law concepts.”83  
But does the Pinkerton case really adopt vicarious liability?  Before 
Pinkerton, “participation in a conspiracy could establish liability for crimes 
committed by other conspirators, [but] this was simply a means of proving 
complicity.”84  In other words, before Pinkerton it was well accepted that 
evidence of participation in a conspiracy could be taken by a jury as a fac-
tor in determining that a person had aided and abetted the crimes which 
  
 80. Sayre, supra n. 63, at 700-01. 
 81. Id. at 701. 
 82. May, supra n. 7, at 24 n. 17 (citing William L. Prosser, The Law of Torts, 467 (4th ed., West 
1971)). 
 83. Vicarious Liability, supra n. 8, at 374; see also Sayre, supra n. 63, at 702 (“vicarious liability is 
a conception repugnant to every instinct of the criminal jurist”); Shellow, supra n. 45, at 1083 (“the 
criminal law has never accepted the doctrine of respondeat superior, which is a form of liability without 
fault”). 
 84. Susan Brenner, Civil Complicity: Using the Pinkerton Doctrine to Impose Vicarious Liability in 
Civil RICO Actions, 81 Ky. L.J. 369, 384 (1992-93). 
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were the objectives of that conspiracy.  What was new, if anything, in the 
Pinkerton case was the proposition that this evidence of conspiracy was to 
be presumed to be evidence of complicity as a matter of law.85  In other 
words, the Pinkerton Court said, in effect, that “conspiracy is conclusive 
on complicity.”86  This prompted some to say that the fault in Pinkerton lay 
in converting a rule of evidence into a rule of law.87  This was, at any rate, 
the position of the drafters of the Model Penal Code: 
Conspiracy may prove solicitation, aid, or agreement to aid, etc.; it 
is evidentially important and may be sufficient for that purpose.  
But whether it suffices ought to be decided by the jurors; they 
should not be told that it establishes complicity as a matter of 
law.88  
Understood not as adopting a theory of vicarious liability89 but rather 
as expanding the law of complicity and treating participation in conspiracy 
as sufficient evidence, in law, for complicity in the substantive crimes that 
were the objects of that conspiracy, the Pinkerton decision is much nar-
rower and less fearsome than either Justice Rutledge or its many other de-
tractors have argued.90  Moreover, there are two other important reasons to 
regard Pinkerton as a narrow holding.  The first comes from language in 
the case itself – dicta in which the Court tries to make clear when the rule 
applies and when it does not.  The other comes from the nature of the 
Pinkerton case itself. 
The majority opinion in Pinkerton states that the holding would not 
necessarily apply if the facts were different: 
A different case would arise if the substantive offense committed 
by one of the conspirators was not in fact done in furtherance of 
the conspiracy, did not fall within the scope of the unlawful pro-
ject, or was merely a part of the ramifications of the plan which 
  
 85. Contra Commonwealth v. Knapp, 26 Mass. 496, 518 (1830) (“The fact of the conspiracy being 
proved against the prisoner, is to be weighed as evidence in the case having a tendency to prove that the 
prisoner aided, but it is not in itself to be taken as a legal presumption of his having aided unless dis-
proved by him.  It is a question of evidence for the consideration of the jury.”). 
 86. Fletcher, supra n. 2, at 172. 
 87. See Vicarious Liability, supra n. 8, at 378 (criticizing this holding for permitting “the prosecu-
tion to trust to a mechanical rule of law as an alternative to unequivocal proof”); see generally May, 
supra n. 7. 
 88. See Model Penal Code § 2.06 cmt. (a).   
 89. Brenner, supra n. 84, at 385 (“Pinkerton is not actually a rule of vicarious liability.”). 
 90. See also Developments In the Law, supra n. 1, at 994, 997-98 (“The Supreme Court appears in 
Pinkerton to have considered the liability of a conspirator for the substantive offense an application of 
the complicity doctrine . . . . It is arguable that the defendant in the Pinkerton case itself could have 
been convicted as an accomplice.”). 
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could not reasonably be foreseen as a necessary and natural conse-
quence of the unlawful agreement.91  
From this statement, courts have inferred that in  
order for the Pinkerton rule imposing liability for the substantive 
crimes of other conspirators to apply, it must be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that (1) the substantive offense was committed 
by one of the members of the conspiracy, (2) while the one com-
mitting the crime was a member of the conspiracy, (3) in further-
ance of the conspiracy, and92 (4) that the substantive crime was a 
reasonably foreseeable part of the conspiracy.93  
The facts of Pinkerton also show the narrow nature of the holding.  
The substantive crimes with which both brothers were charged were the 
very crimes which were the objectives of the alleged conspiracy between 
them.  As Justice Douglas said for the majority, the “unlawful agreement 
contemplated precisely what was done.  It was formed for the purpose.  
The act done was in execution of the enterprise.”94  The issue in the 
Pinkerton case has been precisely formulated: “If one conspirator commits 
the crime which was the very objective of the wrongful combination, is the 
co-conspirator guilty of that target offense, without having done more than 
join in the conspiracy?”95 
The Pinkerton holding was not the great leap into unchartered and 
dangerous waters that the dissent and other critics claimed it to be.  The 
Court did expand the definition of the actus reus of complicity a bit to say 
that evidence of participation in conspiracy is evidence of complicity as a 
matter of law.96  But the Court did not impose a categorical vicarious li-
ability which had never been known before, and both the dicta about rea-
sonable foreseeability and the specific facts of the case indicate that the 
holding was quite limited.   
How well would these limitations continue to apply in later cases?  
Does the subsequent development of the Pinkerton doctrine, after 1946, 
show that the courts have made an unjustified departure from established 
  
 91. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647-48. 
 92. At least some commentators have read this “and” as an “or”.  See e.g. Pamela H. Bucy, Crimes 
By Health Care Providers, U. Ill. L. Rev. 589, 627 (1996). 
 93. Carl Horn, For the Criminal Practitioner: Review of 4th Circuit Opinions in Criminal Cases 
Decided in Calendar Year 1993, 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 159, 183 (1993); see e.g. U.S. v. Chorman, 
910 F.2d 102, 111 (4th Cir. 1990).   
 94. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647. 
 95. Perkins, supra n. 11. 
 96. See Vicarious Liability, supra n. 8, at 374 (expressing view that, in doing so, the Court went too 
far, broadly interpreting the complicity statute in violation of the principle that criminal statutes should 
be strictly construed). 
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precedent on the issue of when one person may be guilty of a crime – par-
ticularly murder – committed by another?   
III.  EXPANSIONS OF THE PINKERTON DOCTRINE IN THE CASE LAW 
As we have seen, the Pinkerton doctrine has been applied in an enor-
mous number of prosecutions.  Moreover, the doctrine has evolved in those 
cases to a point considerably beyond what the Pinkerton case itself says.  A 
sampling of a few of those cases is sufficient to give a sense of how 
changes from the original rule emerged. 
A. State v. Bridges 
The opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Bridges,97 as 
contrasted with the opinion of the intermediate Appellate Division in the 
same case, shows an important expansion of Pinkerton to substantive 
crimes that were reasonably foreseeable by the defendant but not the origi-
nal objectives of the conspiracy. The defendant Bennie Bridges got into a 
heated argument with one Andy Strickland at a birthday party.  Bridges left 
the party, angrily shouting that he would return with help from his “boys.”  
Bridges then picked up two acquaintances, co-defendants Bing and Rolle, 
and asked them to return to the party with him because he expected a con-
frontation.  They agreed to come and armed themselves with guns to hold 
back the crowd and “intimidate the majority of the boys at the party” so 
Bridges could fight with Strickland.  When they returned to the party, 
Bridges began fighting with a friend of Strickland while Bing and Rolle 
shouted to the crowd, “Nobody jump in” and “Nobody here is Superman.” 
Someone in the crowd hit Bing in the face, whereupon Bing and Rolle 
drew their guns and fired them into the crowd, hitting and killing one of 
the onlookers.  Defendant Bridges was convicted of conspiracy to commit 
aggravated assault and of several substantive crimes, including murder, for 
which charge he received a sentence of life imprisonment, with parole in-
eligibility for thirty years.  He appealed, contending that he was not re-
sponsible for the murder.98  
The applicable statute in Bridges is reasonably typical of the kind of 
Pinkerton statute which some states have adopted.99  It provided that a per-
son is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when, 
  
 97. 628 A.2d 270 (N.J. 1993). 
 98. Id. at 271-72. 
 99. But see Bonnie et al., supra n. 9, at 623 (expressing the view that Pinkerton is enforced in most 
states without statute: “The Pinkerton rule is probably the law in a majority of American jurisdictions.  
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(3) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of 
an offense; or 
(4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person.100  
The intermediate Appellate Division reversed Bridges’ murder convic-
tion, holding that he was not responsible for the murder committed by Bing 
and Rolle in the course of their conspiracy. The court went on to say that 
the state statute “contemplated ‘complete congruity’ between accomplice 
and vicarious conspirator liability.”101  In other words, the intermediate 
court said that Pinkerton liability based on conspiracy required “a level of 
culpability and state of mind that is identical to that required of accomplice 
liability.”102  Adopting what has sometimes been described as the “same 
mens rea approach” to accomplice liability,103 the Appellate Division 
therefore concluded that “a conspirator is vicariously liable for the substan-
tive crimes committed by co-conspirators only when the conspirator had 
the same intent and purpose as the co-conspirator who committed the 
crimes.”104 
The Appellate Division went on to argue that accomplice liability re-
quires subjective fault.  Vicarious criminal liability based on Pinkerton can 
require no less.  As the State Supreme Court later said,  
the Appellate Division thus interpreted Pinkerton to prescribe a re-
quirement of subjective foreseeability of the criminal conse-
quences as a basis for vicarious co-conspirator liability.105 
But Pinkerton’s subjective foreseeability also requires more of prose-
cutors, according to the Appellate Division in Bridges.  Under Pinkerton, 
the Appellate Division said, a crime “must have been within [a co-
conspirator’s] contemplation when he entered into the agreement and rea-
sonably comprehended by his purpose and intention in entering into the 
agreement.”106  In other words, to convict a defendant like Bridges of the 
substantive crime of murder under Pinkerton, it would not be enough to 
show that the killing was within his contemplation when the shooting was 
  
Typically, it is enforced without explicit statutory support.”); see also Bridges, 628 A.2d at 285 (stating 
that the “Pinkerton doctrine is a judicially-created doctrine”). 
 100. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-6b(3)-(4) (2004). 
 101. Bridges, 628 A.2d at 273. 
 102. Id. at 272. 
 103. The Model Penal Code adopts this view.  Contrast the natural and probable consequences ap-
proach, discussed in some detail later in this article, which, like Pinkerton, adopts a standard of negli-
gence to assess the guilt of the accomplice in one crime for unanticipated crimes growing out of the 
original crime.  
 104. Bridges, 628 A.2d at 272. 
 105. Id. at 274. 
 106.  Id. 
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done.  It would be necessary for the prosecutor to show that, when he en-
tered the initial agreement – not a conspiracy to murder, of course, since 
the defendants never agreed to kill anyone,107 but a conspiracy to assault – 
the killing was within Bridges’ subjective contemplation and “compre-
hended by his purpose and intention in entering into the agreement.”108 
The substantive crimes at issue in Pinkerton were, as we have seen, 
within Daniel Pinkerton’s contemplation and “comprehended by his pur-
pose and intention in entering the agreement.”  As the Court pointed out in 
that case, those crimes were the very objects of the initial agreement.  The 
difficulty in Bridges is that the crime of murder was not the precise object 
of the conspiracy.  To hold Bridges guilty of murder under Pinkerton, the 
court would have to say that Pinkerton is significantly different from the 
“same mens rea” or so-called model-penal-code approach to accomplice 
liability and that it would permit convictions on something less than sub-
jective fault. 
This is precisely the position that the New Jersey Supreme Court took 
on appeal from the Appellate Division in Bridges.  Citing State v. Stein109 
and other cases, the Court held that, under Pinkerton, 
so long as a conspiracy is still in existence, “an overt act of one 
partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifi-
cally directed to that act,” provided the substantive act could “be 
reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the 
unlawful agreement.”110 
Complicity, in other words, requires subjective fault.  Pinkerton, by 
contrast, is objective.  In Bridges, the New Jersey Supreme Court said the 
Pinkerton doctrine, 
purported to impose vicarious liability on each conspirator for the 
acts of others based on an objective standard of reasonable fore-
seeability . . . .  [I]t was understood that the liability of a co-
conspirator under the objective standard of reasonable foresee-
ability would be broader than that of an accomplice, where the de-
fendant must actually foresee and intend the result of his or her 
acts.111 
  
 107. They were, of course, not charged with conspiracy to murder, nor could they have been, as the 
dissent in the State Supreme Court case points out. Id. at 283 (O’Hern, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
 108. Id. at 274. 
 109. 360 A.2d 347 (N.J. 1976). 
 110. Bridges, 628 A.2d at 274. 
 111. Id.  
File: Pauley (macro) Created on:  12/19/2005 11:59:00 PM Last Printed: 12/20/2005 12:30:00 AM 
22 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 4, No. 1   
In Bridges, the New Jersey Supreme Court, adopting a totally different 
interpretation of the relevant New Jersey statute than the Appellate Divi-
sion, held that the Pinkerton doctrine should be expanded beyond the 
original Pinkerton case to make a conspirator guilty of crimes that were 
“not within the scope of the conspiracy if they are reasonably foreseeable 
as the necessary or natural consequences of the conspiracy.”112  In Bridges, 
although the conspiracy “did not have as its objective the purposeful kill-
ing of another person,” the agreement did contemplate “bringing loaded 
guns” to the party, thus creating a situation in which “it could be antici-
pated that the weapon might be fired at the crowd.”  The Court reasoned: 
From that evidence a jury could conclude that a reasonably fore-
seeable risk and a probable and natural consequence of carrying 
out a plan to intimidate the crowd . . . would be that one of the 
gunslingers would intentionally fire at somebody, and, under the 
circumstances, that act would be sufficiently connected to the 
original conspiratorial plan to provide a just basis for a determina-
tion of guilt for that substantive crime.113 
Justice O’Hern, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Bridges, 
condemned the majority for allowing “a sentence of life imprisonment to 
be imposed on the basis of a negligent appraisal of a risk that another 
would commit a homicide.”114  This case, he went on to say, is “an exam-
ple of the most extreme sort – life imprisonment with no possibility of pa-
role for thirty years on the basis of a negligent mental state.”115  The legis-
lature, he averred, never intended that someone could be convicted of mur-
der and sentenced to life in prison for negligence.  O’Hern added, “[w]ith 
certain exceptions for motor-vehicle accidents, negligence will not even 
sustain a conviction of reckless manslaughter.”116  O’Hern concluded that 
the approach to Pinkerton adopted by the court, “may implicate a person, 
on the basis of negligence or stupidity, in very serious offenses which he 
never contemplated or agreed, expressly or by implication, to have perpe-
trated.”117 
O’Hern also made the point that, since the defendant Bridges did not 
intend to kill the victim, he could not have been convicted of attempted 
murder, or as an accomplice to the murder, or of conspiracy to commit 
  
 112. Id. at 280. 
 113. Id. at 281. 
 114. Id. (O’Hern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 115. Id. at 284. 
 116. Id. at 286. 
 117. Id. at 284 (quotation and citation omitted). 
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murder.118  Like felony murder,119 he concluded, this application of 
Pinkerton destroys the “carefully measured grid of criminal responsibil-
ity.”120  Pinkerton liability under the statute, he said, should be reserved for 
cases like the Pinkerton case itself – where the issue concerns guilt of “the 
crime or crimes that were the object of the conspiracy.”121 
The New Jersey Supreme Court majority in Bridges, then, makes the 
dictum in the Pinkerton case about reasonable foreseeability central to the 
Pinkerton doctrine.122  In the Pinkerton case itself, reasonable foreseeabil-
ity was not an issue because the crimes committed were the very ones 
agreed on.  The Bridges case extends Pinkerton to substantive crimes that 
were reasonably foreseeable but not the objects of the conspiracy. 
B. People v. Bringham 
Nor is Bridges the only case that so expands Pinkerton.  In other cases 
and other jurisdictions, courts have focused on this standard of reasonable 
foreseeability,123 emphasizing that co-conspirators can be liable for sub-
stantive crimes based on negligence even where negligence would hardly 
be sufficient for commission of the substantive offense by the principal.124 
  
 118. O’Hern says that “an accomplice must be a person who acts with the purpose of promoting or 
facilitating the commission of the substantive offense for which he is charged as an accomplice.” Id. at 
283 (quoting State v. White, 484 A.2d 691, 694 (N.J. 1984)). Conspiracy, he says, also requires pur-
pose.  Id. (O’Hern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 119. The merger doctrine, which requires an independent felony for application of the felony-murder 
rule, is often said to be based on a similar concern for the gradation of the homicide system. 
 120. Id. at 283-84 (O’Hern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 121. Id. at 286. 
 122. See Shellow et al., supra n. 45, at 1086 (stating, “foreseeability is an absolutely essential element 
of Pinkerton liability, despite Justice Douglas’ seemingly cavalier treatment of the issue in almost an 
afterthought to the opinion”). 
 123. The Court, however, omitted language about reasonable foreseeability just a few years after 
Pinkerton.  Nye & Nissen v. U.S., 336 U.S. 613, 618 (1949) (stating that “a conspirator could be held 
guilty of the substantive offense even though he did no more than join the conspiracy, provided that the 
substantive offense was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and as a part of it”). 
 124. See e.g. U.S. v. Luskin, 926 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1991) (affirming the defendant’s guilty conviction 
under Pinkerton for use of a firearm during a conspiracy to kill his wife); Johnson v. State, 482 S.W.2d 
600, 605 (Ark. 1972) (reversed in part on different grounds) (defendant held responsible for the death 
of a girl during a burglary attempt); Commonwealth v. Roux, 350 A.2d 867, 871-72 (Pa. 1976) (defen-
dant held guilty of murder after he conspired with others to rob and beat the victim).  For a discussion 
of the application of the Pinkerton doctrine to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), one of Congress’s main statutory 
weapons in the war on drugs, consult Berra, supra n. 8, at 603-04, who calls this statutory provision 
“one of the more ‘popular’ federal mandatory minimum statutes” and says that it  
 
prohibits the use of firearms in relation to drug trafficking crimes.  Under Section 924(c), 
drug offenders are subject to a minimum of five years in prison if a firearm is used in fur-
therance of their underlying drug crimes.  Furthermore, . . . drug conspirators are not only 
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But what does “reasonable foreseeability” mean?  Courts using the 
Pinkerton doctrine often have great difficulty defining and using that 
term.125 It has been said, for example, that “reasonable foreseeability” 
“could signify any position within a broad range” such as, 
for example, all acts with a substantial probability of occurrence 
(e.g., one chance in five); acts that are more probable than not to 
occur; acts of very high probability (e.g., 90%); and acts so likely 
that their occurrence is a practical certainty. . . . [N]o court uses 
one of these degrees of probability for all contexts; each varies the 
requirement with the circumstances.126 
There is also the problem of the erratic and unpredictable co-
conspirator.  Does this mean that practically any crimes are reasonably 
foreseeable because the co-conspirator could have done anything?  In Peo-
ple v. Brigham,127 the defendant, an experienced hit man, and an acquaint-
ance named Bluitt, armed with automatic weapons, set out in a car to find 
and kill a man named Chuckie.  They saw a teenager on the street and de-
fendant said to Bluitt, “That is Chuckie.”  Bluitt responded, “we’re gonna 
get him.”  As the car got closer to the teenager, however, the defendant 
recognized that he was not Chuckie, and so warned Bluitt, saying, “man, 
that is not Chuckie, man.”  Bluitt ignored this, saying again “we’re gonna 
get him” and directed the driver to stop.  Appellant and Bluitt got out of the 
car and walked up to the teenager, a fourteen-year-old named Barfield.  
When they got closer, defendant said to Bluitt, “Don’t do it.  It ain’t cool.  
That’s not the dude, man.  Come on.”128  But Bluitt rejected the defen-
dant’s advice, saying he wanted to let people know “we [are] serious.”  
Bluitt fired twice, hitting and killing Barfield.129 
  
Id. at 603-04.  Berra goes on to say that the federal courts have relied on Pinkerton in insisting on this 
foreseeability standard.  “If such use is found to be ‘reasonably foreseeable,’ the unarmed accomplices 
are immediately subject to, at minimum, the same minimum five-year penalty as the armed principal.”  
Id. at 606.  Because courts often say that drug trafficking is by nature dangerous and violent, however, 
Berra says that reasonable foreseeability is always found in such cases and the standard more closely 
approximates one of strict liability.  Id. 
 125. See People v. Luparello, 187 Cal. App. 3d 410, 452 n. 2 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1987) (Weiner, J., 
concurring) (while focusing on the natural and probable consequences approach to the law of complic-
ity, Justice Weiner discusses what he calls the “foreseeable consequence” doctrine and asks whether 
“probable and natural consequences” means the same thing as “natural and foreseeable consequences”). 
 126. U.S. v. Powell, 929 F.2d 724, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 127. 216 Cal. App. 3d 1039 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1989).  
 128. See Sayre, supra n. 63, at 721 n. 111 (expressing view that the courts in cases like this are “im-
posing criminal liability upon one who fails to prevent another from engaging in anti-social conduct – a 
very effective means of social pressure”). 
 129. Brigham, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 1044-45. 
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At trial, the prosecution argued and the jury found that the defendant 
knew that Bluitt was “hardheaded”130 and erratic, and, as such, he could 
reasonably have foreseen that Bluitt, once set in motion, might very well 
kill someone other than the assigned target, even if told not to do so.131  
The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder.132  The Court of Ap-
peal affirmed, pointing out that the defendant “was an experienced assassin 
or hit man as was Bluitt” and they “had worked together in the past.”  De-
fendant admitted that he knew Bluitt was “hardheaded,” and the court said 
that “one who is hardheaded may be foreseeably and irrationally difficult 
to dissuade or control once embarked upon a criminal enterprise.”133  Even 
if the killing of Barfield did not further the parties’ original criminal con-
spiracy to kill Chuckie, a point that the court is careful not to concede, “it 
was nonetheless a foreseeable result134 . . . of . . . the original . . . agreement 
to kill Chuckie.”135 
C. U.S. v. Alvarez 
Both Bridges and Brigham are only slightly more difficult cases than 
Pinkerton itself.  Even though the conspiracies in those cases did not con-
template precisely what was done, still the crimes committed were of the 
same nature as those agreed upon.136  There were conspiracies to assault 
  
 130. The dissent makes much of this term: 
 
The only ostensible “‘evidence’ of what the majority describes as Bluitt’s ‘presumably er-
ratic and uncontrollable nature’ is a single passing reference to Bluitt as ‘hardheaded’ in 
one of appellant’s several lengthy statements to the police . . .  According to the dictionary 
definition, [the dissent notes by contrast] a ‘hardheaded’ person is not irrational or erratic, 
but ‘stubborn, willful, . . . not moved by sentiment or impulse; having no illusions, practi-
cal, sober, realistic.’” 
 
Id. at 1067 (Kline, P.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1042. 
 133. Id. at 1054. 
 134. The court equates reasonable foreseeability with the natural and probable consequences:  
 
[W]hether or not Bluitt’s conduct was ‘reasonably foreseeable’ is the equivalent of whether 
that conduct was a reasonable or natural and probable consequence of a criminal act of 
Bluitt which appellant agreed to and did encourage and facilitate.  The Supreme Court has . 
. . [treated these terms] as synonymous in the law of aiding and abetting. 
 
Id. at 1056.  The court thus seems to be equating the Pinkerton doctrine with the natural and probable 
consequences approach to complicity.  As the dissent interprets the majority’s argument, the “deriva-
tive liability of an aider and abettor for the ‘natural and probable consequences’ of a criminal enterprise 
is indistinguishable from that imposed upon a defendant charged with conspiracy.”  Id. at 1058 (Kline, 
P.J. dissenting).  But are they the same?  This issue will be examined later in the article.  
 135. Id. at 1055. 
 136. For the view that the logic of Brigham dates back to nearly the beginning of the twentieth cen-
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and/or kill, and someone was assaulted and killed.  A different problem 
arises when there is a conspiracy to commit one crime and another, com-
pletely different, crime is committed in furtherance of that conspiracy.137 
In U.S. v. Alvarez,138 drug dealers in a Miami motel became involved 
in a shoot-out with agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire-
arms (BATF).  One of the BATF agents was killed.  The dealers were con-
victed of conspiracy to commit and of commission of various drug of-
fenses.  The two dealers who fired the shots were convicted of first-degree 
murder of a federal agent.  The Pinkerton issue was whether three other 
drug dealers could be convicted of murder for these killings, even though 
they played no role in the shooting.139 
On appeal, these defendants argued that, as a matter of law, “murder is 
not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of a drug conspiracy,”140 that the 
trial judge “erred in deciding to submit the Pinkerton issue to the jury,”141 
and that “their murder convictions therefore should be reversed.”142  Con-
ceding that “the instant case is not a typical Pinkerton case” because the 
murder “was not within the originally intended scope of the conspiracy, but 
instead occurred as a result of an unintended turn of events,”143 the Elev-
enth Circuit nevertheless rejected the defendants’ argument and held that, 
“although the murder convictions of the three appellants may represent an 
unprecedented application of Pinkerton, such an application is not im-
proper.”144 
The Alvarez case represents a significant expansion of the Pinkerton 
doctrine to cases of “reasonably foreseeable but originally unintended sub-
stantive crimes.”145  Conscious of this expansion, the Eleventh Circuit em-
phasized important limits on the holding: 
Although our decision today extends the Pinkerton doctrine to 
cases involving reasonably foreseeable but originally unintended 
substantive crimes, we emphasize that we do so only within nar-
  
tury at least, see Sayre, supra n. 63, at 704 (saying  [i]n 3 Green. Ev., sec. 44, the law is thus stated: “If 
the party employed to commit a felony on one person, perpetrates it, by mistake, upon another, the 
party counseling is accessory to the crime actually committed.”) (quoting State v. Kennedy, 67 S.E. 
152, 154 (S.C. 1910)). 
 137. Sayre poses the issue thus, in the context of the law of complicity: “The difficulties arise when 
the agent’s acts do not fall within the precise scope of the other’s commands.” Sayre, supra n. 63, at 
696. 
 138. 755 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 139. Id. at 836. 
 140. Id. at 848. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 850. 
 144. Id. at 848.   
 145. Id. at 850. 
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row confines.  Our holding is limited to conspirators who played 
more than a “minor” role in the conspiracy, or who had actual 
knowledge of at least some of the circumstances and events culmi-
nating in the reasonably foreseeable but originally unintended sub-
stantive crime.146 
The court also said it was “mindful of the potential due process limitations 
on the Pinkerton doctrine in cases involving attenuated relationships be-
tween the conspirator and the substantive crime.”147  And the court cited 
evidence supporting the conclusion that all three of the appellants “were 
more than ‘minor’ participants in the drug conspiracy” and that all “had 
actual knowledge of at least some of the circumstances and events leading 
up to the murder.” The court concluded that the “relationship between the 
three appellants and the murder was not so attenuated as to run afoul of the 
potential due process limitations on the Pinkerton doctrine.”148 
The Alvarez case and its limitations are not binding precedent in state 
courts.  Even the Pinkerton case itself is not binding on state courts.  Both 
cases are based on the federal conspiracy and complicity statutes, and are 
not applicable in state trials on state charges.149  But, as we have seen, 
many state courts do follow the Pinkerton doctrine.  In so doing, many 
follow the expansions of the Pinkerton doctrine which cases like Bridges, 
Brigham, and especially Alvarez have worked out.  It is well settled that a 
conspirator is guilty of reasonably foreseeable150 but totally unintended 
  
 146. Id. at 851 n. 27. 
 147. Id. at 850.  In a footnote, the Court cited the words of Judge Mansfield of the Second Circuit, 
who, in discussing the natural and probable consequences approach to complicity, stated: 
 
[I]t seems to me to place an undue strain on the concept to reason that, once a general con-
spiracy is shown, a minor or subordinate member who commits some act in furtherance of it 
thereby becomes an aider and abettor of parallel conduct of which he was unaware on the 
part of another member . . . merely because he should have reasonably foreseen that his con-
duct might assist others to commit such acts.   
 
Id. 
 148. Id. at 851. 
 149. Views that Pinkerton’s statutory basis is unclear have been stated:  
 
[W]hile the court did not identify the statutory basis of its holding, the only general provi-
sion of the Criminal Code defining vicarious liability is section 2, which recites the com-
mon-law rule that one who “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures . . . is pun-
ishable as a principal.” . . .  [The court] must have been construing section 2 to encompass 
conspiratorial as well as complicitous liability.  In light of the strong policy against com-
mon-law crimes, explicit statutory definition of the conspirator’s liability for the substantive 
crimes of a co-conspirator would seem the preferable alternative.  
 
Developments in the Law, supra n. 1, at 994-95 (footnotes omitted). 
 150. In drug conspiracies, the courts seem to take the view that violent crimes are always a reasona-
bly foreseeable consequence.  See Berra, supra n. 8, at 606 (stating,  
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substantive crimes committed by his co-conspirator in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, even when those crimes differed markedly from the conspir-
acy’s objectives.151  How much of a departure is this expanded Pinkerton 
doctrine from traditional aiding and abetting law?  If the original Pinkerton 
case can be seen as only a slight expansion of aiding and abetting, is this 
also true of the expanded Pinkerton doctrine?  Would abolition of 
Pinkerton require a change in the way the law looks at aiding and abetting 
and conspiracy in general?   
IV.  COMPARING THE PINKERTON DOCTRINE WITH THE LAW OF 
COMPLICITY 
A careful analysis of another hypothetical case will demonstrate that 
the Pinkerton doctrine does not significantly change the law of complicity.  
Suppose that A gives B some bricks and urges him to go to the roof of a 
building in a large city in the middle of the day and casually throw the 
bricks off the roof.  B does so and kills X.  A is charged with second-
degree murder.152 
The legal concept of causation could make A guilty.  We could say 
that A caused the death of X through B’s actions.  The problem with this 
approach, obviously, is that it may not be possible to satisfy either of the 
two types of causation – but for (actual) causation and proximate (legal) 
  
the Pinkerton doctrine of liability appears to be moving perilously close to strict liability.  
Repeatedly characterizing the drug-dealing business as dangerous and violent, the circuit 
courts seem to accept the notion that the presence of weapons should always be expected.  
This allows the courts to gradually exhaust the Pinkerton reasonable foreseeability standard 
of almost all substantive meaning.). 
 
 151. See e.g. Park v. Huff, 506 F.2d 849, 863 (5th Cir. 1975) (affirming conviction in case where 
defendant had been found guilty of murder on evidence only that he participated in a liquor store con-
spiracy without proof that he had knowledge of or participated in the murder conspiracy); U.S. v. Gi-
ronda, 758 F.2d 1201, 1212 (7th Cir. 1985) (asserting that the Pinkerton doctrine imposes liability not 
only for “the object offense, but also for acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy” and thus 
upholding convictions for substantive crimes based on this Pinkerton rationale); Martinez v. State, 413 
So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d Dist. App. 1982) (restating the “general rule, that a co-conspirator is criminally 
responsible for a crime committed in pursuance of the common purpose or which results as a natural 
and probable consequence of the conspiracy”). 
 152. This illustration is drawn from Holmes’ own example:  
 
[F]or instance, if a workman on a house-top at mid-day knows that the space below him is a 
street in a great city, he knows facts from which a man of common understanding would in-
fer that there were people passing below . . . .  If then, he throws down a heavy beam into the 
street, he does an act which a person of ordinary prudence would foresee is likely to cause 
death. 
 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 47 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., The Belknap Press of Har-
vard University 1967).   
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causation – both of which are required.  Actual, but for causation, means, 
of course, that, but for A’s encouragement, B would not have thrown the 
bricks off the roof and killed the person.  This, by itself, is not easy to 
show.  Proximate causation means that A’s encouragement was the proxi-
mate cause of the act and the resulting death – that there were no inde-
pendent, intervening causes between A’s encouragement and the resulting 
death.  But B’s action could be seen as an independent intervening cause.  
After all, B did not have to listen to A’s encouragement or advice.  B could 
have disregarded A’s advice and chosen not to throw the bricks.  If B’s 
action broke the chain of causation, A’s encouragement is not the proxi-
mate cause of the death of X.153 
If A is not guilty of second-degree murder through the causation doc-
trine, he may be guilty under the alternative theory of complicity or aiding 
and abetting.154  Could we convict A of the second-degree murder of X by 
the doctrine of aiding and abetting?  Was A an accomplice to B’s murder 
of X?  The answer is probably yes.  As long as A intended to encourage the 
act of throwing the bricks off the roof and as long as A had the mens rea 
for the crime of second-degree murder, A can be guilty of second-degree 
murder of X by aiding and abetting.  In other words, if A wanted B to 
throw the bricks off the roof and if A was extremely reckless about 
whether the result of B throwing the bricks off the roof would be the kill-
ing of someone, then A can be guilty of second-degree murder of X.  It 
would not matter if A’s encouragement was neither the but for nor the 
proximate cause of X’s death.  Even if B might well have thrown the 
bricks off the roof anyway and even if B’s choice to follow A’s advice is 
seen as an independent intervening act of free will breaking the chain of 
causation, still A’s encouragement can make him guilty of second-degree 
murder of X here under the doctrine of aiding and abetting.155 
  
 153. Several commentators assert that human choice and free will present a problem for the causation 
doctrine in holding one criminal guilty of a crime committed by another. See Luparello, 187 Cal. App. 
3d at 440 (citing Kadish) (“[T]he uncaused nature of a principal’s volitional act impairs, if not pre-
cludes, a causative explanation for accomplice liability.”); Sanford Kadish, Complicity and Blame: A 
Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 Cal L. Rev. 323, 333 (1985) (“We regard a person’s acts as 
the products of his choice, not as an inevitable, natural result of a chain of events.  Therefore, antece-
dent events do not cause a person to act in the same way that they cause things to happen, and neither 
do the antecedent acts of others.  To treat the acts of others as causing a person’s actions (in the physi-
cal sense of cause) would be inconsistent with the premise on which we hold a person responsible.”); 
Mueller, supra n. 67 (citing H.L.A. Hart & Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law, (2d ed., Oxford Uni-
versity Press 1985) and arguing that “human choices and actions are intervening factors that break the 
causal chain”). 
 154. For a review of the way in which the law of complicity functions as an “alternative doctrine” to 
causation in holding one individual criminally accountable for the crimes of another, consult Dressler, 
supra n. 25 and Sanford Kadish, A Theory of Complicity, in Ruth Gavison, Issues in Contemporary 
Legal Philosophy: The Influence of H.L.A. Hart (Ruth Gavison ed., Clarendon Press 1987).   
 155. See also Mueller, supra n. 67, at 2171-72 (stating, “[m]ost courts ignore the inherent causation 
 
File: Pauley (macro) Created on:  12/19/2005 11:59:00 PM Last Printed: 12/20/2005 12:30:00 AM 
30 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 4, No. 1   
Suppose, however, that the facts of the hypothetical were a bit differ-
ent.  Suppose that, after A encouraged B casually to throw the bricks off 
the roof, B had gone to the roof, seen his arch enemy X, and had then 
thrown one of the bricks at X as hard as he could and had thereby killed X.  
Would A be guilty of premeditated (first degree) murder of X under a the-
ory of aiding and abetting?156 
The answer to this question may depend on whether we are using the 
Model Penal Code or the Natural and Probable Consequences approach to 
aiding and abetting.  The Model Penal Code approach to aiding and abet-
ting provides in pertinent part: 
(3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission 
of an offense if: 
a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commis-
sion of the offense, he 
(i) solicits such other person to commit it; or 
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in 
planning or committing it; . . . . 
(4) When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an 
accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in 
the commission of that offense, if he acts with the kind of culpabil-
ity, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the com-
mission of the offense.157 
Under the Model Penal Code approach, A would probably not be 
guilty of premeditated murder in the hypothetical for two reasons.  One, he 
did not intentionally encourage the specific act of throwing the brick at 
X.158 Two, he does not have the mens rea for premeditated murder: he did 
not intend to kill anyone and was at worst reckless about whether the con-
sequences of his act – encouraging casual brick throwing – would be kill-
ing someone.159 
  
problems associated with complicity”). 
 156. This is what Sayre once called the hard type of case “when the agent’s acts do not fall within the 
precise scope of the other’s commands.” Sayre, supra n. 63, at 696. 
 157. Model Penal Code § 2.06 (3)-(4). 
 158. See Model Penal Code § 2.06, cmt. (a) (stating, “[the defendant] must have the purpose to pro-
mote or facilitate the particular conduct that forms the basis for the charge, and thus he will not be 
liable for conduct that does not fall within that purpose”). 
 159. This so-called “same mens rea” approach to aiding and abetting has been discussed.  See May, 
supra n. 7, at 30 (stating, “[t]o be held accountable, . . . the accomplice must have the same intent as the 
principal”); Mueller, supra n. 153, at 2168 (stating, “accomplice liability should only attach where the 
accused accomplice possesses the full mens rea requirement of the substantive offense”).  The drafters 
of the Model Penal Code were apparently not certain whether their position was dominant.  See John-
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Under the natural and probable consequences approach, by contrast, 
“[s]econdary parties . . . are also guilty of unintended crimes committed by 
the primary party if those crimes are a natural and probable consequence of 
the intended offense.”160  This approach long predates the Pinkerton case 
and the Model Penal Code and has deep roots in the common law.161  It is 
similar to what has been called the “common purpose” or “joint enterprise” 
approach, whereby, as Professor Sanford Kadish summarized in his study 
of “Reckless Complicity,” “so long as S is an accomplice in any crime of P 
he is thereby made an accomplice of any other crime that he should have 
foreseen (the American version) or did foresee (the English version) P 
might commit.”162 
Following the natural and probable consequences approach, A proba-
bly would be guilty of second-degree murder of X by aiding and abetting 
in our hypothetical because intentional murder could be seen as a natural 
and probable consequence of the crime he intentionally encouraged – a 
kind of reckless endangerment.  In other words, if A is guilty of reckless 
endangerment by intentionally encouraging B to throw bricks off the roof, 
he is also guilty of the crime of intentional murder if he should have fore-
seen that, by giving B the bricks and encouraging B to throw them, B 
might very well use the opportunity to commit the crime of intentional 
murder.163 
  
son, supra n. 2, at 1146 n. 38 (quoting Model Penal Code § 2.06, cmt. at 24 (tent. draft no. 1, 1953)) ( 
“Whether or to what extent this position involves departure from existing law, it is most difficult to 
say.”); LaFave & Scott 1986, supra n. 3, at 590-91; Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General 
Part 133-36 (2d ed., Stevens & Sons Limited 1961) (both urging the Model Penal Code as the better 
approach to this question). 
 160. Dressler, supra n. 25, at 97. 
 161. See Sayre, supra n. 63, at 699 (“Under the early law as laid down by Staunford and Plowden, A 
was liable if, having commanded or procured B to commit a crime, B . . . committed a crime different 
from the one directed, but a natural and probable consequence flowing out of it.”).  Relying on Coke 
and then Blackstone, Sayre tells us that this “continued to be the law with surprisingly little change 
through the barren centuries following.” Id. 
 162. Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 J. Crim. L. and Criminology 369, 375 (1997).  For a 
modern application of this common design or purpose approach, see e.g. U.S. v. Carter, 445 F.2d 669 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (Fahy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that where “defendant did not 
himself kill” the victim and “seemed to repudiate the killing,” the test of whether the defendant could 
be guilty of murder for his co-felon’s action “should be . . . whether [the killing] was in furtherance of a 
common design or purpose”).  
 163. The doctrine of natural and probable consequences usually arises in a different context:  most 
often, murders during robberies.  See e.g. Developments in the Law, supra n. 1, at 1008 n. 582.  
  
An apparent exception to the requirement of intent in the law of complicity arises when the 
robber is held for a murder perpetrated by his associate in the course of an armed robbery.  
However, it is reasoned that since the defendant desired that he and his partner commit the 
robbery, he may be taken to have intended the probable results. 
 
Id. 
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The Pinkerton doctrine would produce a slightly different result than 
the natural and probable consequences approach when applied to these 
facts.164  Under the Pinkerton rule, we would first ask whether A and B 
were in a criminal conspiracy at the time that B committed premeditated 
murder of X.165 Assuming that both A and B were in a criminal conspiracy 
to commit reckless endangerment, by virtue of their agreement to throw 
bricks off the roof, the next step would be to ask whether the intentional 
murder of X was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy 
and whether it was in furtherance of the conspiracy.  According to Brig-
ham, previously discussed, one could answer yes to both of those ques-
tions.  If killing the wrong person was in furtherance of the criminal con-
spiracy to kill Chuckie,166 and if it was a reasonably foreseeable conse-
quence of that conspiracy, then intentionally killing someone with a brick 
could be in furtherance of and a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the 
crime of recklessly endangering people’s lives with bricks.  Surely, the 
crime of intentional murder is no further removed from the crime of reck-
less endangerment than the crime of intentional murder was from dealing 
in illegal drugs in Alvarez.  Both the Pinkerton doctrine and the natural and 
probable consequences rule would, in short, permit A to be convicted of 
intentional murder here.167  
So far, then, the Pinkerton doctrine seems to be roughly the same as 
the natural and probable consequences approach to aiding and abetting.168  
  
 164. Of course, Pinkerton would produce a sharply different result here from the Model Penal Code 
approach to aiding and abetting.  For discussions of the relationship between Pinkerton and complicity 
doctrines, consult Susan W. Brenner, Of Complicity and Enterprise Criminality: Applying Pinkerton 
Liability to RICO Actions, 56 Mo. L. Rev. 931 (1991) and Robinson, A Question of Intent: Aiding and 
Abetting Law and the Rule of Accomplice Liability Under 924(c), 96 Mich. L. Rev. 783, 805 n. 97 
(1997). 
 165. Of course, under both complicity and Pinkerton, A generally cannot be guilty of murder of X 
unless the principal (B) is also guilty.  For a discussion of exceptions to this, see the treatment of the 
innocent agency doctrine in any standard review of criminal law. 
 166. The Court of Appeals in Brigham stated:  
 
even if that murder did not further the parties’ original criminal agreement to kill Chuckie 
(which we do not concede), it was nonetheless a foreseeable result (a natural and probable 
consequence) of either the original appellant-Bluitt agreement to kill Chuckie, or of any of the 
original criminal acts of Bluitt which were thereafter encouraged or facilitated by appellant. 
 
216 Cal. App. 3d at 1055. 
 167. For a critique of both the Pinkerton and natural and probable consequences approach to a situa-
tion like this, and a defense of the Model Penal Code “same mens rea” approach to accomplice liabil-
ity, consult Mueller, supra n. 153, at 2172-73 which argues, “the accomplice should possess the full 
mens rea required of a perpetrator of the substantive offense.” 
 168. For the similarity of the two doctrines, see People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d 547, 560 (Cal. 1984) 
(stating, “that the liability of an aider and abettor extends also to the natural and probable consequences 
of the acts he knowingly and intentionally aids and encourages”); State v. Davis, 682 P.2d 883, 885-86 
(Wash. 1984) (holding defendant guilty of first degree robbery when he stood as a lookout while an-
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Are there any circumstances where these two doctrines would produce 
different results?  Does Pinkerton ever go beyond natural and probable 
consequences?   
Let us revisit the hypothetical previously considered.  Suppose that A 
organizes a conspiracy to rob banks.  He hires B to rob Bank 1 and hires C 
to rob Bank 2.  B and C have not met each other, but each knows of the 
other’s role in the conspiracy and each agrees to be a part of the criminal 
enterprise.  D helps B rob Bank 1 by providing a getaway car.  During his 
robbery of Bank 2, C intentionally kills X, a bank guard.  Are B and D 
guilty of the intentional murder of X?169 
Using causation, of course, there is likely to be no guilt here.  It would 
be very difficult for the prosecution to show that, “but for” any actions by 
B or D, X would not have been killed, let alone that C’s action was not an 
independent intervening cause breaking the chain of proximate causation.   
Under the Model Penal Code approach to aiding and abetting, B and D 
would also not be guilty on these facts.  Neither B nor D encouraged the 
act of killing X.  Neither B nor D has the mens rea for intentional murder 
because neither intended that anyone would be killed.170 
Even under the natural and probable consequences approach to aiding 
and abetting, one might say there are problems with convicting B and D of 
intentional murder of X under these facts.  This approach, we recall, says 
that if you aid and abet one crime, you are guilty of all other crimes that 
are reasonably foreseeable (natural and probable) consequences of that 
crime.171  But did B and D aid and abet C’s robbery of Bank 2?  What did 
they do, one might ask, to assist this crime?  If they did not aid and abet the 
robbery of Bank 2 by C, how can they be responsible for the murder of X 
  
other person robbed a pharmacy at gunpoint, even though the defendant may have been unaware that 
the principal was armed).  Distinction between the two doctrines have been discussed.  See Shellow et 
al., supra n. 45, at 1098 n. 85 (stating that “[t]he confusion between accomplice liability and Pinkerton 
liability is common to, but not confined to, judicial opinions in this area”). 
 169. For a hypothetical similar, but not identical to this, consult Developments in the Law, supra n. 1, 
at 996 and Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Process 739 (6th ed., Little, 
Brown & Company 1995) [hereinafter Kadish & Schulhofer]. 
 170. For a look at how Pinkerton would differ sharply from this approach, consult  Bonnie, et al., 
supra n. 9, at 624 which states, “[i]f the otherwise applicable principles of complicity limit the liability 
of an accomplice to crimes which he or she had an actual purpose to aid or encourage, the effect of the 
Pinkerton approach to the scope of liability for conspiracy would be considerable.”   
 171. See e.g. Brigham, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 1052 (stating, “the aider and abettor is also liable for the 
natural and probable consequences of any criminal act he knowingly and intentionally aids and abets, 
in addition to the specific and particular crime he and his confederates originally contemplated”) (em-
phasis in original); Bonnie et al., supra n. 9, at 586 (stating, “the liability of an accomplice includes the 
natural and probable consequences of the criminal endeavor that the accomplice meant to aid or en-
courage.  This rule applies chiefly where the principal actor engages in some act of violence not ex-
pressly endorsed by the accomplice”). 
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even if it was a natural and probable consequence – a reasonably foresee-
able consequence – of C’s robbery of Bank 2? 
Is it really true that B and D did not aid and abet C’s robbery of Bank 
2, however?  They surely had the mens rea for that robbery.  After all, they 
had agreed to rob banks.  As far as the actus reus, wasn’t agreeing to be 
part of the conspiracy to rob the banks sufficient encouragement of C to 
rob Bank 2 to qualify as aiding and abetting?  As we have seen, practically 
any small and insignificant act – smiling, applauding, shouting – can be 
enough for the actus reus of aiding and abetting. Couldn’t it be said that B 
and D did aid and abet C’s robbery by agreeing to be part of the whole 
plan?  Surely such agreement made C’s robbery more likely by leading 
him to believe that, if anything went wrong, for instance, he would have B 
and D, as well as A and anyone else in the conspiracy, to back him up.172  
This is precisely the position on aiding and abetting that the original 
Pinkerton case takes. If any small encouragement can be aiding and abet-
ting,173 then agreement to be part of a conspiracy can be as well.  Thus, B 
and D are guilty of aiding and abetting the robbery of Bank 2.  Or, put dif-
ferently, they are guilty of that crime – just as Daniel Pinkerton was guilty 
of the substantive tax violations committed by his brother while he was in 
jail – because their agreement encouraged the bank robbery and they had 
the mens rea for bank robbery as it was the very object of their agreement. 
But what of the murder of X?  How can aiding and abetting the rob-
bery of Bank 2 explain why B and D are guilty of aiding and abetting the 
murder which occurred during the robbery of Bank 2?  The answer, of 
course, is that once we recognize that B and D are accomplices in the rob-
bery of the bank, then under both natural and probable consequences and 
under Pinkerton, they are both guilty of the murder of X as long as it was a 
natural and probable consequence of the robbery. Since murders often 
happen in the course of bank robberies, a court is likely to say that B and D 
are both guilty of intentional murder of X under both the natural and prob-
able consequences approach to aiding and abetting and the Pinkerton doc-
trine.174 
  
 172. For the view that the Pinkerton doctrine would make B and D guilty of C’s murder of X in such 
a situation because their “acts of alliance” in the conspiracy “caused” the crime of murder to be com-
mitted, consult Brenner, supra n. 84, at 386.  For a similar approach, also consult  Developments in the 
Law, supra n. 1, at 998-99 which states, “[c]riminal acts done in furtherance of a conspiracy may be 
sufficiently dependent upon the encouragement and material support of the group as a whole to warrant 
treating each member as a causal agent to each act.” 
 173. See Mueller, supra n. 67, at 2171, for the view that even trivial acts like supplying a toy gun to 
frighten the victim or telling the principal when the store to be robbed is least crowded will qualify as 
aiding and abetting. 
 174. Many cases and commentaries conclude that murder is a natural and probable consequence of 
robbery.  See People v. Tiller, 447 N.E.2d 174 (Ill. 1982) (holding an accomplice may be guilty of a 
murder committed by the principal during a robbery even though the accomplice had left the scene and 
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The point of all this is that the Pinkerton doctrine, even in its broadest 
application to crimes that were not the original objectives of the conspiracy 
but which should have reasonably been foreseen, does not represent a sig-
nificant change in the law of complicity.175  Abolishing the Pinkerton doc-
trine, then, would logically mean either abolishing the natural and probable 
consequences approach to aiding and abetting – a move recommended by 
the Model Penal Code but rejected by many states176 – or changing the 
law’s requirement of the actus reus of complicity to say that words alone, 
even words of agreement and encouragement, cannot constitute aiding and 
abetting.  Conversely, we could restrict Pinkerton by saying that B and D 
were not in a conspiracy with C to rob banks unless B and D actually met 
with C face to face and assisted him in his specific crime.  But that would 
require a fundamental change in the law of conspiracy.177 Changing 
Pinkerton, in short, means changing a great deal more. 
V.  THE JUSTICE OR INJUSTICE OF THE PINKERTON DOCTRINE 
If justice demands that the Pinkerton doctrine be abolished or substan-
tially modified, then, one might say, courts or legislatures should do so, 
  
had warned the principal not to kill the victim); Sayre, supra n. 63, at 706 (“death is not an improbable 
consequence of robbery or burglary”).   
 175. May is thus largely correct in his conclusions that Pinkerton “is not an aberration, but rather, a 
reaffirmation of some basic tenets of the common law” and “is merely a restatement of the common 
law doctrine which holds accessories liable for the natural and probable consequences of their acts.”  
May, supra n. 7, at 24, 35. 
 176. In 1989, the Court of Appeals of California declared that “[t]he ‘natural and probable conse-
quence’ rule of accomplice liability . . . is established in the criminal laws of most American jurisdic-
tions.” Brigham, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 1058. In 1997, Bonnie et al. amended this conclusion in their 
treatise, stating that the “rule of natural and probable consequences is still good law in many jurisdic-
tions.  It has been abandoned, however, in most states that have adopted comprehensive revisions of 
their penal laws.” Bonnie et al., supra n. 9, at 586. 
 177. This problem of the size of the conspiracy has been called the most serious difficulty of conspir-
acy law which the Pinkerton doctrine aggravates.  See Model Penal Code, § 2.06 cmt. (a) at 307 (“law 
would lose all sense of just proportion if simply because of the conspiracy itself each [of the minor 
players in the conspiracy] were held accountable for thousands of additional offenses of which he was 
completely unaware and which he did not influence at all”); LaFave & Scott 1986, supra n. 3, at 589 
(“If the Pinkerton rule were adhered to, each prostitute or runner in a large commercialized vice ring 
could be held liable for an untold number of acts of prostitution by persons unknown to them and not 
directly aided by them.”). Several commentators acknowledge that conspiracies can be very large and 
encompass many minor players. See e.g. Peter J. Henning, Individual Liability For Conduct By Crimi-
nal Organizations in the United States, 44 Wayne L.  Rev. 1305, 1321-22 (1998) (discussing cases 
where broad conspiracy charges among large numbers of defendants have been upheld); Johnson, 
supra n. 2, at 1144-48 (“Conspiracy thus permits any member of a large-scale organization to be pun-
ished for all the crimes committed by its members . . . . Once it is established that all participants con-
spired generally to further all the crimes of the organization, it is not surprising that they each should be 
held responsible for all of the crimes actually committed in furtherance of that agreement.  Reforms 
which would abolish the conspiracy-complicity rule without also abandoning the principle that all 
participants in a conspiracy are guilty of the same crime of conspiracy are basically inconsistent.”). 
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regardless of any other changes that would have to be made in the law of 
complicity or conspiracy.  A powerful argument can be presented that jus-
tice does demand that Pinkerton be abolished.  After all, is it fair to say 
that a person, by joining a conspiracy with another person, can be respon-
sible for crimes that this other person commits in furtherance of the con-
spiracy – even a crime as serious as murder – if all the state can prove is 
that he should have foreseen these crimes?  Is it fair to make one person 
guilty of a murder committed by another person based on a prior agree-
ment to commit some other crime and a mental state of negligence?178 
Two questions are presented: (1) Should negligence ever be a suffi-
cient mental state for murder?  In other words, should A be guilty of mur-
der of B if A negligently kills B?; and (2) If A’s guilt cannot be predicated 
on negligence, should the law find C guilty of B’s murder based on a neg-
ligence theory if A and C were committing a crime at the time that A killed 
B? 
The preliminary answer to the first question is that negligence is usu-
ally not sufficient to convict A of the murder of B.  Under the common law 
and under the model penal code, extreme recklessness or recklessness with 
depravity is usually the minimum mental state for a conviction of mur-
der.179  
Murder, however, can be based on negligence.  If A was intoxicated at 
the time he killed B, then the Model Penal Code and many states say that 
the relevant issue is not whether he was subjectively aware of the risk that 
his action would kill B – what the Model Penal Code calls recklessness – 
but rather whether he would have been aware of that risk if he had been 
sober.180  In that way, the relevant inquiry comes very close to a negligence 
standard: it asks not what risk he was aware of, but what risk he would 
have been aware of had his mental state been closer to that of the reason-
able (sober) man.181 
  
 178. Once again, it is important to emphasize that the terms negligence and recklessness are being 
used as the Model Penal Code defines them. See Model Penal Code § 2.02. 
 179. See generally Kadish & Schulofer, supra n. 169, at 458; LaFave & Scott, supra n. 3, at 666-70 
and any other standard texts or treatises on criminal law. 
 180. See Model Penal Code § 2.08 (2) (“When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if 
the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had 
he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.”).   
 181. Of course the rationale for this also turns on the fact that A was reckless when he began to drink, 
and therefore his recklessness carries over to his later act, done in a state of intoxication. Still, the fact 
remains that he may not have been aware of the risk that his actions posed to others at the time that he 
did the specific act that killed.  In that sense, he is being punished for negligence – for taking a risk that 
he should have been aware of (if he had been sober) but was not.  In Hamilton v. Commonwealth, the 
Court found a defendant guilty of murder for a drunk-driving homicide where the evidence only 
showed that he “should have known of the plain and obvious likelihood that death or great bodily 
injury could have resulted.” 560 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Ky. 1977).  However, in a dissenting opinion, Jus-
tice Palmore disagrees: 
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Felony murder can also be seen as a way in which A can be guilty of 
murder of B based on negligence.  It is, of course, true that, in its strict 
common-law form, felony murder is based on strict liability, not on negli-
gence.  Still, where the felony must be a felony inherently dangerous to 
life, as it must be in practically all jurisdictions today,182 one could say that 
the doctrine uses a negligence standard.  A reasonable person would be 
aware that, if he or she commits armed bank robbery or rape or arson, 
someone could be killed.  A killing proximately resulting from such a fel-
ony is foreseeable and that is at least part of the reason why we make that 
killing felony murder.  
The law does, in short, sometimes make negligence a sufficient mental 
state for murder.  Should it do so?  Is there any rationale that can be of-
fered for such a position? Oliver Wendell Holmes thought so, and said as 
much in his famous book The Common Law.  In his chapter on Criminal 
Law, Holmes is at pains to stress that “the actual state of mind accompany-
ing a criminal act plays a different part from what is commonly sup-
posed.”183 We tend to think, Holmes says, that criminal law is primarily 
concerned with personal subjective fault.  But “liability to punishment 
cannot be finally and absolutely determined by considering the actual per-
sonal unworthiness of the criminal alone,” Holmes answers.  “That consid-
eration will govern only so far as the public welfare permits or de-
mands.”184  
The “purpose of the criminal law,” according to Holmes, following in 
the utilitarian tradition of Bentham and Mill, “is only to induce external 
conformity to rule.”  The law “is ready to sacrifice the individual so far as 
necessary in order to accomplish that purpose” so that “the actual degree of 
personal guilt involved in any particular transgression cannot be the only 
element, if it is an element at all, in the liability incurred.”185 
  
 
I concede that fatal carelessness in the operation of a motor vehicle calls for stern punishment, 
but murder is something else.  There simply is a difference in culpability between committing 
an act that endangers people whose presence is known and an act that endangers people whose 
presence should be anticipated but in fact is not known. 
 
Id. at 544 (Palmore, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).  For the view that, in most courts, negligent 
drunk driving which results in death can be punished as murder, consult U.S. v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945 
(4th Cir. 1984) and David Luria, Death on the Highway: Reckless Driving as Murder, 67 Or. L. Rev. 
799 (1988). 
 182. See e.g. People v. Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361 (Cal. 1972) (discussing inherently dangerous felony 
limitation) (overruled in part on different grounds); see generally Fletcher, Reflections on Felony Mur-
der, 12 Sw. U. L. Rev. 413 (1981).  
 183. Holmes, supra n. 152, at 42. 
 184. Id. at 41. 
 185. Id. at 42. 
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Holmes does not deny that criminality is based on blameworthiness.  
But it is blameworthiness judged by an objective, external standard, not the 
personal motives or intentions of the criminal that counts, Holmes avers.  
A law, Holmes says, “which punished conduct which would not be 
blameworthy in the average member of the community would be too se-
vere for that community to bear.”186  The test, Holmes says, must be 
not only external . . . but . . . of general application. [Laws] do not 
merely require that every man should get as near as he can to the 
best conduct possible for him.  They require him at his own peril to 
come up to a certain height.187  
Holmes describes a standard in these passages which is, without question, 
an objective standard of negligence.  He describes “the conception of the 
average man, the man of ordinary intelligence and reasonable prudence.”  
He says criminal behavior should be measured against a standard which 
will “take no account of incapacities, unless the weakness is so marked as 
to fall into well-known exceptions, such as infancy or madness.”  Each 
individual is required, in short, to have the qualities of the law-abiding 
reasonable man, and “to have those qualities at his peril.”188 
Applying this conception of criminal law to murder, Holmes states that 
“foresight of the consequences of the act is enough in murder as in tort,” 
and that the “test of foresight is not what this very criminal foresaw, but 
what a man of reasonable prudence would have foreseen.”  In other words, 
if 
the known present state of things is such that the act done will very 
certainly cause death, and the probability is a matter of common 
knowledge, one who does the act, knowing the present state of 
things, is guilty of murder, and the law will not inquire whether he 
actually foresaw the consequences or not.189 
Holmes illustrates his point with an example similar to the hypothetical 
previously considered: 
For instance, if a workman on a house-top at mid-day knows that 
the space below him is a street in a great city, he knows facts from 
which a man of common understanding would infer that there were 
  
 186.   Id. 
 187. Id. at 43. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 45.  Holmes, of course, applies this rationale in the famous case of Commonwealth v. 
Pierce, 138 Mass. 165 (Mass. 1884), where he upholds the manslaughter conviction of a physician who 
killed a woman by wrapping her in rags soaked in kerosene without apparent evidence that the defen-
dant was subjectively aware of the risk that his actions posed to her life. 
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people passing below.  He is therefore bound to draw that infer-
ence, or, in other words, is chargeable with knowledge of that fact 
also, whether he draws the inference or not.  If then, he throws 
down a heavy beam into the street, he does an act which a person 
of ordinary prudence would foresee is likely to cause death, or 
grievous bodily harm, and he is dealt with as if he foresaw it, 
whether he does so in fact or not.  If a death is caused by the act, 
he is guilty of murder.190 
In short, the law of murder, for Holmes, as indeed all law, requires 
men “at their peril to know the teachings of common experience, just as it 
requires them to know the law . . . .  A harmful act is only excused on the 
ground that the party neither did foresee, nor could with proper care have 
foreseen harm.”191 
For Holmes, then, negligence – defined, as the Model Penal Code 
does, by an objective standard of carelessness – is clearly sufficient for 
serious crimes like murder.  More recent commentators have similarly de-
fended such use of negligence in the criminal law.192  In Punishment and 
Responsibility, for example, H.L.A. Hart emphasizes that negligence is not 
the same as strict liability  – that there is, as he puts it,  
a world of difference between punishing people for the harm they 
unintentionally but carelessly cause, and punishing them for the 
harm which no exercise of reasonable care on their part could have 
avoided.193   
Hart also notes that, in “Anglo-American law there are a number of 
statutory offenses in which negligence . . . is made punishable.”  Moreover, 
he says, “the common law as distinct from statute also admits a few 
crimes, including manslaughter, which can be committed by inadvertent 
negligence.”  Hart distinguishes “‘inadvertent negligence’ . . . not only 
from deliberately and intentionally doing harm but also from ‘reckless-
ness,’ that is, wittingly flying in the face of a substantial, unjustified 
risk.”194 
  
 190. Id. at 47. 
 191. Id. at 48. 
 192. It should be noted that not all commentators go so far as Holmes in endorsing a standard of 
negligence for murder cases. See Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 
U. Ill. L. Rev. 363 (2004), arguing that “intentional action and forbearance are the only” proper objects 
of criminal punishment.  Morse argues for a “consistent subjectivism” in criminal law.  His view is thus 
sharply opposed to that of Holmes. 
 193. H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 136 (Oxford 
University Press 1968).   
 194. Id. at 137.  Hart’s definitions of negligence, a term which he uses synonymously with “inadver-
tent negligence,” and recklessness are very similar to those used by the American Law Institute in the 
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Hart recognizes that some commentators on criminal law criticize this 
use of negligence.  He cites Glanville Williams for the view that punish-
ment for negligence “cannot be justified on either a retributive or a deter-
rent basis”195 and Jerome Hall for the opinion that “punishment should be 
confined to ‘intentional or reckless doing of a morally wrong act.’”196 
These scholars are wrong, however, Hart stresses.  Negligence can be a 
sufficient mental state for crime because in “some cases at least we may 
say ‘he could have thought about what he was doing’ with just as much 
rational confidence as one can say of any intentional wrong-doing ‘he 
could have done otherwise.’”197 
Commentators like Holmes and Hart, then, have recognized that negli-
gence can be a sufficient mental state for serious crimes.  Whether negli-
gence is sufficient for murder or not, however, can it be sufficient for com-
plicity in murder?  In other words, as previously noted, if A cannot be 
guilty of murder of B if A killed B negligently, should the law find C 
guilty of murder of B based on negligence if A and C were committing a 
crime at the time A killed B? 
The answer, of course, as we have seen, is yes, if C and A were com-
mitting a crime when A killed B, and if the killing of B was a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of the crime.  Under both the Pinkerton doctrine 
and the “natural and probable consequences” approach to aiding and abet-
ting, if A is guilty of murder of B based on a mental state far greater than 
negligence – intent to kill, for example – C, A’s partner in crime, can also 
be guilty of that murder based on a mental state no greater than negligence.  
The rationale for this result is that, by agreeing to commit a crime with A, 
C should be responsible for any other, reasonably foreseeable crimes that 
grow out of that initial crime.  By agreeing to do one bad thing, in effect, C 
has agreed to be responsible for other bad things.198  
  
Model Penal Code. 
 195. See id. at 138 (citing Williams, supra n. 159). 
 196. Hart, supra n. 193, at 138.   
 197. Id. at 152.  Hart goes on to point out that sometimes it is fair and accurate to say that the defen-
dant truly “could not have helped it,” as for example “when we have evidence, from the personal his-
tory of the agent or other sources, that his memory or other faculties were defective, . . . [as] in the case 
of a child or a lunatic.”  “What is crucial,” Hart insists, “is that those whom we punish should have had, 
when they acted, the normal capacities, physical and mental, for doing what the law requires and ab-
staining from what it forbids, and a fair opportunity to exercise those capabilities.”  Both of the follow-
ing questions must be answered yes, in Hart’s view, then, for punishment to be justified: “(1) Did the 
accused fail to take those precautions which any reasonable man with normal capacities would in the 
circumstances have taken? (2) Could the accused, given his mental and physical capacities, have taken 
those precautions?”  Like Holmes, however, Hart recognizes that it “may, in practice, be impossible to 
do more than excuse those who suffer from gross forms of incapacity, viz. infants or the insane.” Id. at 
152-55. 
 198. For a defense of this view, consult Brenner, supra n. 84, at 387 which states, “[t]he criminal 
doctrines discussed above impute liability for crimes others actually perpetrate by holding one liable 
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Is this a fair result?  Yes, if one recognizes that a choice to do one 
thing makes one responsible for later consequences of that choice, even if 
those consequences were not intended or even foreseen when the initial 
choice was made. There is ample support in the history of philosophy for 
this rationale of punishment.  Aristotle, for example, says that when a per-
son makes a choice, he is responsible for the consequences of that choice.  
Choice, according to Aristotle, is the result of conscious deliberation 
and is distinct from mere voluntary action.  When man acts by choice, Ar-
istotle says, he is a free agent.  He freely chooses certain actions; over 
time, those actions become habits; eventually, those habits instill in him a 
good or a bad character.  Because he makes the first choice, Aristotle says, 
he is responsible for the consequences of this choice.  In other words, if a 
person chooses to do bad acts, he chooses to become a bad person.  If he 
chooses to walk in the sun, he chooses to perspire.  If he chooses to com-
mit a crime, he chooses to pay the penalty for that crime.  If he chooses to 
commit one crime, he chooses to commit any other crimes that are rea-
sonably foreseeable and probable consequences of that crime.199  The point 
is that Anglo-American law has followed and continues to follow this Aris-
totelian reasoning.200  As one widely cited treatise on criminal law has 
stated, 
the established rule, as it is usually stated by courts and commenta-
tors, is that accomplice liability extends to acts of the principal . . . 
which were a “natural and probable consequence” of the criminal 
scheme the accomplice encouraged or aided.201 
In his recent essay on “Reckless Complicity,” Kadish illustrates this per-
spective – which he links not only to the natural and probable conse-
quences doctrine but also to the “common purpose” or “joint enterprises” 
approach of English law – with a passage from Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s 
Sherlock Holmes story The Adventure of The Priory School: 
Holmes stated:  “I must take the view . . . that when a man em-
barks upon a crime, he is morally guilty of any other crime which 
may spring from it.”202 
  
for the ‘bad act’ of either assisting in the commission of a crime or entering into a conspiracy of which 
the criminal consequences were a foreseeable result.” For a critique of this approach, consult Mueller, 
supra note 67, at 2173 and Kadish, supra note 153, at 353. 
 199. See generally Aristotle, Ethics, 1135 b 5-7; see also Pauly, The Jurisprudence of Crime and 
Punishment from Plato to Hegel, 39 Am. J. Juris. 97, at 110-111 (1994). 
 200. See generally e.g.  K.J.M. Smith, A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity (1991). 
 201. LaFave & Scott 1986, supra n. 3, at 590.   
 202. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventure of the Priory School, in Sherlock Holmes: The Com-
plete Novels and Stories, vol. 1, 744 (Bantam Books, 1986). 
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In short, strong arguments affirm that A can be guilty of murder of B if 
A killed B negligently. Moreover, even if the state needs to show that A 
killed B with a mental state worse than negligence in order to convict A of 
B’s murder, C can be guilty of murder of B if A and C were committing a 
crime when A killed B, and if the murder was a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of that crime.  This position that the law takes is consistent 
with a long philosophical tradition – a tradition which finds expression in 
the writings of giants of jurisprudence as diverse as Aristotle and Holmes.  
Viewed in this way, the Pinkerton doctrine is not an aberration in Ameri-
can law, but rather is consistent with the way the law has been, and, argua-
bly, with the way it should continue to be. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
The Pinkerton case itself is not a radical departure from existing law.  
It is, at most, a small expansion of the actus reus requirement for complic-
ity and an avowal that agreement is evidentiary proof of complicity.  
Moreover, the facts of the Pinkerton case show that the case’s holding is a 
narrow one.  In Pinkerton, the crimes with which both brothers were 
charged were the very ones on which they had agreed.  The dictum in 
Pinkerton about reasonable foreseeability, which seems initially to limit 
the holding by suggesting the types of cases where it would not apply, also 
appears to permit an expansion of the Pinkerton doctrine in cases – like 
Bridges, Brigham, and Alvarez – where the crimes committed were not 
originally intended but were reasonably foreseeable consequences of the 
initial crime agreed upon.   
A comparison of this expanded Pinkerton doctrine with the natural and 
probable consequences approach to aiding and abetting – an approach fol-
lowed by some states – shows that the Pinkerton doctrine, even as ex-
panded, is not an aberration.  Rather, the Pinkerton doctrine is fundamen-
tally consistent with American law in many ways. Abolition of the 
Pinkerton doctrine would require major changes in the law, either in the 
law of complicity or of conspiracy or of both. 
Finally, the Pinkerton doctrine is consistent with a philosophical tradi-
tion that can explain why negligence should be a sufficient mental state to 
convict a person of a serious crime like murder and, perhaps more impor-
tant, a tradition which can explain why a choice to do one bad act can 
make one responsible for further unforeseen but foreseeable bad conse-
quences. 
In the end, the Pinkerton doctrine is less of an aberration than an illus-
tration of a good deal of our existing law and of some of the theoretical 
assumptions behind it.  Changing Pinkerton would mean not only changing 
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much of current law but also rejecting a number of important principles 
upon which that law is based. 
